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Abstract
Recessions often happen after periods of rapid accumulation of houses, consumer
durables and business capital. This observation has led some economists, most notably
Friedrich Hayek, to conclude that recessions often reflect periods of needed liquida-
tion resulting from past over-investment. According to the main proponents of this
view, government spending or any other form of aggregate demand policy should not
be used to mitigate such a liquidation process, as doing so would simply result in a
needed adjustment being postponed. In contrast, ever since the work of Keynes, many
economists have viewed recessions as periods of deficient demand that should be coun-
tered by activist fiscal policy. In this paper we reexamine the liquidation perspective of
recessions in a setup where prices are flexible but where not all trades are coordinated
by centralized markets. The model illustrates why liquidations likely cause recessions
characterized by deficient aggregate demand and accordingly suggests that Keynes’
and Hayek’s views of recessions may be closely linked. In our framework, interventions
aimed at stimulating aggregate demand face a trade-off whereby current stimulus post-
pones the adjustment process and therefore prolongs the recessions, but where some
stimulative policies may nevertheless remain desirable.
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1 Introduction
There remains considerable debate regarding the causes and consequences of recessions.
Two views that are often presented as opposing, and which created controversy in the recent
recession and its aftermath, are those associated with the ideas of Hayek and Keynes.1 The
Hayekian perspective is generally associated with viewing recessions as a necessary evil.
According to this view, recessions mainly reflect periods of liquidation resulting from past
over-accumulation of capital goods. A situation where the economy needs to liquidate such
an excess can quite naturally give rise to a recession, but government spending aimed at
stimulating activity, it is argued, is not warranted since it would mainly delay the needed
adjustment process and thereby postpone the recovery. In contrast, the Keynesian view
suggests that recessions reflect periods of deficient aggregate demand where the economy is
not effectively exploiting the gains from trade between individuals. According to this view,
policy interventions aimed at increasing investment and consumption are generally desirable,
as they favor the resumption of mutually beneficial trade between individuals.2
In this paper we reexamine the liquidationist perspective of recessions in an environment
with decentralized markets, flexible prices and search frictions. In particular, we examine
how the economy adjusts when it inherits from the past an excessive amount of capital goods,
which could be in the form of houses, durable goods or productive capital. Our goal is not to
offer a novel explanation of why the economy may have over-accumulated in the past,3 but
to ask how it reacts to such an over-accumulation once it is realized. As suggested by Hayek,
such a situation can readily lead to a recession as less economic activity is generally warranted
when agents want to deplete past over-accumulation. However, because of the endogenous
emergence of unemployment risk in our set-up, the size and duration of the recession implied
1 In response to the large recession in the US and abroad in 2008-2009, a high-profile debate around
these two views was organized by Reuters. See http://www.reuters.com/subjects/keynes-hayek. See
also Wapshott [2012] for a popular account of the Hayek-Keynes controversy.
2 See Caballero and Hammour [2005] for an alternative view on the inefficiency of liquidations, based on
the reduction of cumulative reallocation and inefficient restructuring in recessions.
3 There are several reason why an economy may over-accumulate capital. For example, agents may
have had overly optimistic expectations about future expected economic growth that did not materialize,
as in Beaudry and Portier [2004], or it could have been the case that credit supply was unduly subsidized
either through explicit policy, as argued in Mian and Sufi [2010] and Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi [2010], or as a
by-product of monetary policy, as studied by Bordo and Landon-Lane [2013].
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by the need for liquidation is not socially optimal. In effect, the reduced gains from trade
between individuals induced by the need for liquidation creates a multiplier process that
leads to an excessive reduction in activity. Although prices are free to adjust, the liquidation
creates a period of deficient aggregate demand where economic activity is too low because
people spend too cautiously due to increased unemployment risk. In this sense, we argue
that liquidation and deficient aggregate demand should not be viewed as alternative theories
of recessions but instead should be seen as complements, where past over-accumulation may
be a key driver of periods of deficient aggregate demand. This perspective also makes salient
the trade-offs faced by policy. In particular, a policy-maker in our environment faces an
unpleasant trade-off between the prescriptions emphasized by Keynes and Hayek. On the
one hand, a policy-maker would want to stimulate economic activity during a liquidation-
induced recession because consumers are too cautious. On the other hand, the policy-maker
also needs to recognize that intervention will likely postpone recovery, since it slows down
the needed depletion of excess capital. The model offers a simple framework where both of
these forces are present and can be compared.
One potential criticism of a pure liquidationist view of recessions is that, if markets
functioned efficiently, such periods should not be very socially painful. In particular, if
economic agents interact in perfect markets and realize they have over-accumulated in the
past, this should lead them to enjoy a sort of holiday paid for by their past excessive work.
Looking backwards in such a situation, agents may resent the whole episode, but looking
forward after a period of over-accumulation, they should nonetheless feel content to enjoy the
proceeds of the past excessive work, even if it is associated with a recession. In contrast, in
our environment we will show that liquidation periods are generally socially painful because
of the multiplier process induced by cautious spending and unemployment risk. In effect, we
will show that everyone in our model economy can be worse off when they inherit too many
capital goods from the past. This result, whereby abundance creates scarcity, may appear
quite counter-intuitive at first pass. To make as clear as possible the mechanism that can
cause welfare to be reduced by such abundance, much of our analysis will focus on the case
where the inherited capital takes the form of a good that directly contributes to utility, such
as houses or durable goods. In this situation we will show why inheriting too many houses
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or durables can make everyone worse off when decisions are decentralized.
A second potential criticism of a pure liquidationist view of recessions is that it often fails
to explain why the economy does not simply reallocate factors to non-durables-producing
sectors during the liquidationist period, and thereby maintain high employment. This criti-
cism of the liquidationist view has been made forcefully, among others, by Krugman [1998].
In particular, this line of criticism argues that since recessions are generally characterized by
decreased production in almost all sectors, this constitutes clear evidence against the liqui-
dationist view. In this paper we show why the coordination problem that arises initially in
the durable goods sector as a result of past over-accumulation can create a contagion effect
that causes consumption of both durable and non-durable goods to decrease simultaneously.
The force that links the markets, and that makes them function as complements instead
of substitutes, is precautionary behavior. Once there is less demand in the durable goods
sector, agents fearing unemployment reduce demand in both sectors, thereby causing the
decreased demand in the durable sector to spillover into non-durables.
The structure of our model builds on the literature related to search models of decentral-
ized trading. In particular, we build on Lucas [1990], Shi [1998], Lagos and Wright [2005] and
Rocheteau and Wright [2005] by allowing alternating decentralized and centralized markets
to allow for a simple characterization of the equilibrium. However, unlike those papers, we
do not have money in our setup. The paper also shares key features with the long tradition of
macro models emphasizing strategic complementarities, aggregate demand externalities and
multipliers, such as Diamond [1982], Cooper and John [1988] and more recently Angeletos
and La’O [2013].
Unemployment risk and its effects on consumption decisions is at the core of our model.
The empirical relevance of precautionary saving related to unemployment risk has been
documented by many, including Carroll [1992], Carroll and Dunn [1997], Carroll, Sommer,
and Slacalek [2012] and Alan, Crossley, and Low [2012]. There are also recent theoretical
papers that emphasize how unemployment risk and precautionary savings can amplify shocks
and cause business cycle fluctuations. These papers are the closest to our work. For example,
Challe and Ragot [2013] have proposed a tractable quantitative model in which uninsurable
unemployment risk is the source of wealth heterogeneity. Our model structure is probably
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most closely related to that presented in Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [2009]. However, their
model emphasizes why the economy may exhibit excessive responses to productivity shocks,
while our framework offers a mechanism that amplifies demand-type shocks. Our paper
also shares many features with Heathcote and Perri [2012], who develop a model in which
unemployment risk and wealth impact consumption decisions. They focus on a strong form
of demand externality that gives rise to multiple equilibria.4 Finally, the works by Ravn
and Sterk [2012], den Haan, Rendahl, and Riegler [2014] and Challe, Matheron, Ragot,
and Rubio-Ramirez [2015] emphasize, as we do, how unemployment risk and precautionary
savings can amplify demand shocks, but the mechanisms in these papers differs substantially
from ours since they rely on nominal rigidities and constrained monetary policy. While the
main mechanism in our model has many precursors in the literature, we believe that our
setup illustrates most clearly (i) how unemployment risk gives rise to a multiplier process
for demand shocks even in the absence of price stickiness or increasing returns, (ii) how
this multiplier process can be ignited by periods of liquidation, and (iii) how policy can and
cannot be used to counter the process.
The remaining sections of the paper are structured as follows. In Section 2, we present
a few motivating facts regarding the liquidationist view of recessions. In Section 3, we
present a static model where agents inherit from the past a given level of capital goods,
and we describe how and why high values of inherited capital can lead to deficient demand
and poor economic outcomes. We begin the analysis with a model featuring only durable
goods. We then extend it to the case of both durable and non-durable goods and show
why inheriting many durable goods can also cause a reduction in non-durable purchases
even when preferences are separable between the two types of goods. Finally, we extend the
static model to the case where the stock of durable goods/houses can be used as collateral
when financial markets are imperfect. In Section 4, we extend the model to an infinite-period
dynamic setting and emphasize how the economy’s behavior is different when it is close to
rather than far from the steady state. We then calibrate the model to illustrate how it can
provide an explanation of the observations we presented in Section 2. Finally, in Section 5,
4 The existence of aggregate demand externalities and self-fulfilling expectations is also present in the
work of Farmer [2010], Chamley [2014] and Kaplan and Menzio [2013].
4
we discuss the trade-offs faced by a policy-maker in our dynamic setup. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivating Observations
The liquidationist view of recessions suggests that the severity and depth of a recession should
reflect the extent to which an economy was in a situation of over-accumulated capital prior
to the downturn. If the economy had gone through a period of substantial over-accumulation
in prior years, then according to the liquidationist view the subsequent recession should be
particularly deep and prolonged, as there would be a need to deplete a large amount of
capital. In this section, we want to present some suggestive evidence in support of this
idea. We first look at a comprehensive measure of capital, “total capital”, which consists
of fixed capital plus durable goods. In the left panel of Figure 1 we present a scatter plot
of the relationship between the depth of postwar US recessions5 and a measure of prior
over-investment. To create this measure of capital over-accumulation, we first construct a
series of cumulated investment by summing past investments using the perpetual-inventory
method over a rolling period of 40 quarters, and then remove a cubic time trend intended
to capture the secular changes in growth rates over the period.6 Our measure of the depth
of a recession is the percentage fall in per capita real GDP from the preceding peak to the
trough of the recession. Further details about the data and the construction of our measures
are presented in Appendix B.
Figure 1
As can be seen in Figure 1, there is a very strong positive correlation between our measure
of capital over-accumulation prior to a recession and the subsequent severity of the recession.
While this evidence is only suggestive, it does support the notion that severe recessions have
generally been preceded by periods of very high investment relative to secular growth. When
we correlate our measure of capital accumulation with the length of the recovery – i.e., the
5 Specifically, our sample runs from 1957Q1 to 2015Q2.
6 Results are robust to using different low-frequency trend-removal methods, including an HP filter.
However, we believe using a low-order polynomial trend to remove low frequency movements in growth rates
is more conservative, since the resulting estimated trend it virtually not affected by recessions. In fact, the
cubic trend we estimate is very close to linear, with a slight slow down in the 70s and 80s.
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time it takes for per capita real GDP to reach its previous peak level – we also find a
strong positive and significant relationship, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1. It is
worth pointing out that these correlations remain strongly positive and significant even if
we exclude the most recent recession.7
An interesting aspect of these results is that severe recessions were generally preceded by
high accumulation of all three classes of capital that constitute total capital. In Table 1, we
report the results of the two following regressions for various measures of capital:
xn = β0 + β1ĉin + εn, (1)
xn = β0 + β1ĉin + β2∆tfpn + εn, (2)
where n indexes recessions, x is either the depth of the recession or the length of the recovery,
ĉi represents deviations from trend of accumulated investment for either total, durable, non-
residential or residential capital and ∆tfpn is the percentage change in TFP from peak to
trough.
As shown in Table 1, a positive correlation between our measure of capital-abundance
and the subsequent depth and length of recessions holds for each of the four individual
types of capital goods. Furthermore, note that this pattern holds even when the change
in TFP from peak to trough is included as a control variable (i.e., equation (2)), which
implies that the observed pattern is not confounded with effects potentially associated with
technological change. In fact, we find that the change in TFP during recessions always enters
insignificantly; that is, deeper and longer recessions are not observed to be associated with
larger concurrent drops in TFP.8
Insert Table 1
Overall, we take this evidence as suggestive of a link between prior accumulation of
capital and the severity of a recession, in line with the Hayekian view. It is worth noting
that this does not necessarily imply that recessions are efficient adjustments of the economy,
as our model will shortly illustrate.
7 When excluding the most recent recession, the correlations with depth and length of recovery are,
respectively, 0.58 and 0.48, with corresponding p-values 0.1 and 0.17.
8 For our measure of TFP we use Fernald’s [2014] series which has been corrected for utilization. Note
that TFP growth was positive in all recessions except for the two of the early 80s (see Figure F.1 in Appendix
F).
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3 Static Model
In this section, we present a stripped-down static model in order to illustrate as simply as
possible why an economy may function particularly inefficiently when it inherits a large stock
of capital from the past. In particular, we want to make clear why agents in an economy
can be worse off when the stock of inherited capital goods is too high. For the mechanism
to be as transparent as possible, we begin by making several simplifying assumptions that
we eventually relax. For example, in our baseline model, we adopt a random matching
setup with a particular matching function and a simple wage-bargaining protocol, while
in Appendix D (available online) we extend to more general matching functions and show
the robustness of our main results to allowing for different bargaining protocols (including
directed search). We also focus on the case where the inherited capital produces services
that directly enter agents’ utility functions. Accordingly, this type of capital can be viewed
as representing houses or other durable consumer goods. In Appendix E (available online)
we discuss how the analysis carries over to the case of productive capital.
In our model, trades are decentralized, and there are two imperfections that together
cause unemployment risk to be an important factor in household consumption decisions.
First, there is a matching friction in the spirit of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides, which
implies that a household may not be able to find employment. Second, there is limited
unemployment insurance, so that households take into account the probability of being
unemployed when making consumption decisions. The limited unemployment insurance in
our model can be rationalized by invoking a standard adverse selection problem. Since this
adverse selection problem can be analyzed separately, in the main body of the text we simply
assume that unemployment insurance is not available.9 The key exogenous variable in the
static model will be a stock of consumer durables that households inherit from the past. Our
goal is to show why and when high values of this stock can cause the economy to function
inefficiently enough to cause a decline in welfare.
The main mechanisms in the model are as follows. Because transactions are not co-
9 In Appendix D.5 we discuss the adverse selection problem that rationalizes the missing insurance market,
and use the concomitant information structure to formulate the social planner’s problem and compare it to
the decentralized outcome.
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ordinated though centralized markets and unemployment is possible, households view the
purchase of durable goods as a risky endeavor, since the ease with which one can pay for these
goods will depend on whether or not one becomes unemployed. In particular, households
in the model purchase goods on credit. If the rate of unemployment is low, agents will be
more willing to purchase durable goods since they know that their future labor earnings are
likely to be sufficient to cover the cost of these purchases. In contrast, when unemployment
is high, agents tend to hold back on making new purchases, since if they become unemployed
they will find it difficult (i.e., costly) to service their resulting debts. Unemployment risk
therefore causes consumption decisions across households act as “strategic complements”:10
when one household consumes less, this reduces the demand for goods and thereby increases
unemployment, which leads other households to also consume less. The result is a potentially
inefficiently large reaction to any impetus.
Inheriting from the past a large amount of durable goods is one such impetus. Because of
the above mechanism, the economy can respond perversely to inheriting too many durable
goods. In particular, if agents inherit a high level of consumer capital (relative to their desired
level, as determined for example by the level of technology), then additional consumer capital
has a low marginal value to the household; that is, household demand for new durable goods
is low. This is the first-round effect. It is important to note that as a result of this first-round
effect, households would never be worse off by inheriting more capital. However, because the
initial low demand depresses the labor market, households will perceive the expected cost
of purchasing new goods as having increased (since they are more likely to end up in the
unemployed state where servicing their debt is more costly), and this will lead to a second-
round effect whereby agents further reduce their purchases. A negative multiplier process is
then set in motion, with the equilibrium outcome being one where agents buy so little, and
economic activity is so depressed, that everyone is made worse off. In this case, agents would
benefit from a coordinated increased in purchases, which captures the notion that inherited
capital causes a situation of deficient demand. As we shall discuss, a social planner would
in such a case want to subsidize hiring by firms so as to help restore efficiency and thereby
allow the economy to benefit (instead of suffer) from inheriting more capital.
10 We use here terminology that was popularized in macroeconomic analysis by Cooper and John [1988].
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3.1 Setup
Consider an environment populated by a mass L of households indexed by j. In this economy
there are two sub-periods, morning and afternoon. In the morning, households may buy a
durable good,11 and try to find employment in the durable-good sector. There will also be
a good produced in the afternoon, which we refer to as a service. For now, it is useful to
interpret the afternoon period as a reduced-form way of capturing the future. As there is
no money in this economy, when the household buys the morning good its bank account
is debited, and when (and if) it receives employment income its bank account is credited.
Then, in the afternoon, households balance their books by repaying any outstanding debts
or receiving a payment for any surplus. These payments are made in terms of the afternoon
good (the service), which is also the nume´raire in this economy.
Most of the action in the model arises in the morning market. Preferences for the morning
are represented by
U(cj)− ν(`j),
where c represents the flow of consumption services derived from the durable good and ` is
the labor supplied by households in the production of durables. The function U(·) is assumed
to be increasing in c, strictly concave and satisfy U ′′′ > 0.12 The dis-utility of work function
ν(·) is assumed to be increasing and convex in `, with ν(0) = 0. Households are initially
endowed with Xj units of durables, which they can either consume or trade. We assume
symmetric endowments, so that Xj = X ∀j.13 In the dynamic version of the model, X will
represent the stock of durable goods and will be endogenous.
The key assumption of the model is that trade in the morning is subject to a coordination
problem because of frictions in the labor market. In the morning, the household splits up
responsibilities between two members. The first member, called the buyer, goes to the
durable-good market to make purchases. The second member searches for employment
opportunities in the labor market. The market for durables functions in a Walrasian fashion,
with both buyers and firms that sell goods taking prices as given. The market for labor in
11 We refer to this good as “durable” in anticipation of its role in the dynamic version of the model.
12 We will also assume when needed that the Inada conditions limc→0 U ′ =∞ and limc→∞ U ′ = 0 hold.
13 In what follows, we will drop the j index except where doing so may cause confusion.
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the morning is subject to a matching friction, with sellers of labor searching for employers
and employers searching for labor. The information assumption is that buyers do not know,
when choosing their purchases of durables, whether the worker member of the household
has yet secured a match. This assumption is an easy modeling device that introduces the
possibility of cautionary behavior, as buyers will worry about unemployment risk when
making purchases.
There is a large set of potential firms operating in the morning who can decide to search
for workers in view of supplying durables to the market. Each firm can hire one worker and
has access to a decreasing-returns-to-scale production function θF (`), where ` is the number
of hours worked for the firm and θ > 0 is a technology shift factor. Production also requires
a fixed cost θΦ in terms of the output good, so that the net production of a firm hiring `
hours of labor is θ [F (`)− Φ]. Φ can be thought of as a vacancy-posting cost, as it is incurred
before a search can be conducted. For now, we will normalize θ to one, and will reintroduce
θ in its general form when we want to talk about the effects of technological change and
balanced growth. We will also assume throughout that F (0) = 0 and that Ω(`) ≡ F ′(`)`
is strictly increasing in `.14 Moreover, we will assume that Φ is sufficiently small such that
there exists an ` > 0 satisfying F (`) − F ′ (`) ` = Φ. These restrictions on the production
technology are always satisfied if, for example, F (`) = A`α, with 0 < α < 1.
We will assume that search is conducted in a random fashion.15 Given the random search
setup, when a firm and a worker match, they need to jointly decide on the number of hours
to work and on the wage to be paid. There are many ways the surplus from the match can be
divided, as long as it remains within the bargaining set. For the greatest clarity of results, we
begin by following Lucas and Prescott [1974] and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [2009] in assuming
that the determination of the wage and of hours worked is done though a competitive pricing
process. In effect, one can view a Walrasian auctioneer as calling out a wage w (in units of
the afternoon good) that equilibrates the demand for and supply of labor among the two
parties in a match. Given that wage, the demand for labor from the firm is therefore given
14 Because we assume free-entry for morning firms, the quantity θΩ(`) will equal net output of durables
(after subtracting firms’ fixed costs) by a single employed worker.
15 In Appendix D.4.2 we extend our results to the case of directed search.
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by the marginal productivity condition
pF ′(`) = w,
where p is the relative price of the morning good in terms of the afternoon one.16 The
supply of labor is chosen optimally by the household in a manner to be derived shortly. This
competitive pricing process has the feature of limiting any within-pair distortions that could
muddle the understanding of the main mechanisms of the model. In Appendix D.4.1, we show
how our results extend to the case where wages and hours worked are instead determined
by a Nash bargaining process. As we show, Nash bargaining introduces additional (and
somewhat unintuitive) elements into the analysis that are most easily understood after this
baseline framework is presented.
Letting N represent the number of firms who decide to search for workers, the number
of matches is then given by the constant-returns-to-scale matching function M(N,L), with
M(N,L) ≤ min{N,L}. The equilibrium condition for the durables market is given by
L · (c−X) = M(N,L)F (`)−NΦ,
where the left-hand side is total purchases of new durables and the right-hand side is the
total available supply after subtracting search costs.
Firms will enter the market up to the point where expected profits are zero. The zero-
profit condition can be written17
M
N
[pF (`)− w`] = M
N
[pF (`)− pF ′(`)`] = pΦ.
At the end of the morning, household j’s net financial asset position aj, expressed in units
of the afternoon good, is given by w`j − p(cj − X), with `j = 0 if the household working
member has not found a job. We model the afternoon so that it is costly to arrive in that
sub-period with debt. For now, we can simply denote the value of entering the afternoon
with assets aj by V (aj), where we assume that V (·) is increasing and weakly concave, with
V ′(a1) > V ′(a2) whenever a1 < 0 < a2; that is, we assume that the marginal value of a unit
16 As will become clear, p can be given an interpretation as a gross interest rate between morning and
afternoon.
17 We assume that searching firms pool their ex-post profits and losses so that they make exactly zero
profits in equilibrium, regardless of whether they match.
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of assets is greater if one is in debt than if one is in a creditor position. As will become
clear, this property of V is precisely the one necessary to generate a cautionary response to
changes in unemployment risk, which (as noted earlier) is a fundamental part of the main
mechanism of the model. In the following sub-section we specify preferences and a market
structure for the afternoon that rationalizes a V (·) function of this form.
Taking the function V (a) as given, we can specify the household’s morning consumption
decision as well as his morning labor-supply decision conditional on a match. The buyer’s
problem in household j is given by
max
cj
U (cj) + µV (w`j − p (cj −X)) + (1− µ)V (−p (cj −X)) ,
where µ is the probability that a worker finds a job and is given by µ ≡ M(N,L)/L.
From this expression, we can see that the consumption decision is made in the presence
of unemployment risk. Note that the equilibrium unemployment rate is given by 1 − µ.
Conditional on being matched, the worker’s problem in household j, taking w as given, can
be expressed as choosing a level of hours to supply in the morning so as to solve
max
`j
−ν(`j) + V (w`j − p (cj −X)).
The first-order conditions associated with these problems are given, respectively, by18
U ′ (cj) = p [µV ′ (w`j − p (cj −X)) + (1− µ)V ′ (−p (cj −X))] ,
ν ′(`j) = wV ′(w`j − p (cj −X)).
From these two equations, we can derive household j’s consumption demand as a function
of the employment rate µ, the relative prices w and p, and the endowment X. Denoting this
function cD(µ,w, p,X), it can be verified that 0 ≤ ∂cD(µ,w,p,X)
∂X
< 1 and ∂c
D(µ,w,p,X)
∂µ
≥ 0. In
words, (i) j’s consumption demand is non-decreasing in X, but its demand for new purchases
(cD − X) is strictly decreasing in X; and (ii) j’s consumption demand is increasing in the
employment rate µ. From this partial-equilibrium perspective (i.e., if µ ,w, and p were
18 As can be seen from the worker’s first-order condition, the equilibrium wage w will in general be affected
by household j’s consumption decision cj . We assume for simplicity that shoppers take the wage as given
when making their consumption decision (i.e., they do not try to manipulate the bargaining process through
their choice of consumption). Under our later assumptions about V , however, this will not be restrictive.
12
held constant), an increase in X would lead to fewer new purchases but (weakly) greater
consumption. Moreover, it can be easily verified that the partial-equilibrium effect on welfare
of inheriting from the past a larger stock of X can only be positive. Thus, for an increase in
X to lead to a fall in consumption and a fall in welfare, it will need to come about through
general-equilibrium effects. In our setup, the relevant general-equilibrium effect will run
though the employment rate µ: the increase in X will lead to fewer new purchases, which in
turn will decrease employment and, since ∂c
D(µ,w,p,X)
∂µ
> 0, this has the potential to reverse
the partial-equilibrium effects and lead to a fall in c and a fall in welfare.
3.2 Deriving the Value Function V (aj)
V (aj) represents the value of entering the afternoon with a net financial asset position aj.
In this subsection, we derive the function V (possessing the key properties assumed in the
previous subsection) by specifying primitives in terms of preferences, technology and market
organization. We choose to model the afternoon in such a way that if there were no frictions in
the morning there would be no trade between agents in the afternoon. Afternoon preferences
are given by
U˜(c˜j)− ν˜(˜`j),
where c˜j is consumption of afternoon services, U˜(·) is increasing and strictly concave in c˜j,˜`
j is the labor used to produce services, and ν˜(·) is increasing and convex in ˜`j.
To ensure that a unit of net assets is more valuable when in debt than when in surplus, let
us assume that households in the afternoon can produce services for their own consumption
using one unit of labor to produce θ˜ units of services. However, if a household in the afternoon
has to produce market services – that is, services that can be sold to others in order to satisfy
debt – then to produce θ˜ units of market services requires them to supply 1 + τ units of
labor, τ > 0. To simplify notation, we can set θ˜ = 1 for now and return to the more general
formulation when talking about the effects of technological change. The continuation value
function V (aj) can accordingly be defined as
V (aj) = max
c˜j ,˜`j
{
U˜(c˜j)− ν˜(˜`j)} subject to
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c˜j =
{˜`
j + aj if aj ≥ 0,˜`
j + (1 + τ)aj if aj < 0.
It is easy to verify that V (aj) is increasing and weakly concave, with a kink at zero. If
ν˜(˜`j) is strictly convex, then V (aj) will be strictly concave, with the key property that
V ′(a1) > V ′(a2) if a1 < 0 < a2; that is, the marginal value of an increase in assets is greater
if one is in debt than if one is in surplus.19 Alternatively, if ν˜(˜`j) is linear, then V (aj) will
be piecewise linear. Nonetheless, it will maintain the key property that V ′(a1) > V ′(a2) if
a1 < 0 < a2. We will initially work with this latter case, and in particular will assume that
ν˜(˜`j) = v˜`j for a constant v. This formulation will greatly reduce the number of general-
equilibrium interactions, allowing us to emphasize the channels we think are most relevant.
In Appendix D.2, we discuss how the results are modified when we allow the function V (·)
to be a general concave function.
3.3 Equilibrium in the Morning Period
Given the function V (·), a symmetric equilibrium for the morning is represented by five
objects: two relative prices (the price of durables p and the wage rate w), two quantities
(consumption of durables by each household c and the amount worked in each match `), and
a number N of active firms, such that
(i) c solves the buyer’s problem taking µ, p, w and ` as given;
(ii) the labor supply ` solves the worker’s problem conditional on a match, taking p, w and
c as given;
(iii) the demand for labor ` maximizes the firm’s profits given a match, taking p and w as
given;
(iv) the durable goods market clears;
(v) firms’ entry decisions ensure zero profits.
19 To avoid backward-bending supply curves, we will also assume that ν˜(·) and U˜(·) are such that V ′′′(aj) ≥
0. This assumption is sufficient but not necessary for later results. Note that a sufficient condition for
V ′′′(aj) ≥ 0 is that both U˜ ′′′(·) ≥ 0 and ν˜′′′(·) < 0.
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The morning equilibrium can therefore be represented by the following system of five equa-
tions:
M(N,L)F (`) = L(c−X) +NΦ, (3)
M(N,L)[pF (`)− w`] = NpΦ, (4)
U ′(c) = p
{
M(N,L)
L
V ′ (w`− p (c−X))
+
[
1− M(N,L)
L
]
V ′ (−p (c−X))
}
,
(5)
ν ′(`) = V ′ (w`− p (c−X))w, (6)
pF ′(`) = w. (7)
In the above system,20 equations (5) and (6) represent the first-order conditions for the
household’s choice of consumption and supply of labor. Equations (4) and (7) represent
a firm’s entry decision and its labor demand condition. Finally, (3) is the goods market
clearing condition.
At this level of generality it is difficult to derive many results. Nonetheless, we can
combine (5), (6) and (7) to obtain the following expression regarding one characteristic of
the equilibrium,
ν ′(`)
U ′(c)
{
1 + (1− µ)
[
V ′ (−p (c−X))
V ′ (w`− p (c−X)) − 1
]}
= F ′(`). (8)
From equation (8), we see that as long as µ < 1, the marginal rate of substitution between
leisure and consumption will not be equal to the marginal productivity of work; that is, the
economy will exhibit a labor market wedge given by
(1− µ)
[
V ′ (−p (c−X))
V ′ (w`− p (c−X)) − 1
]
.
Note that both unemployment risk (µ < 1) and imperfect insurance (V ′ (−p (c−X)) 6=
V ′ (w`− p (c−X))) are needed for the wedge to be non-zero. In this environment, contem-
plating the possibility of being unemployed agents hold back on purchases, which in turn
causes the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption to be low relative
20 To ensure that an employed worker’s optimal choice of labor is strictly positive, we assume that
limc→0 U ′(c) > lim`→0
ν′(`)
F ′(`) .
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to the marginal productivity of labor. As we will see, changes in X will cause this wedge to
vary, which will cause a feedback effect on economic activity.
Our main goal now is to explore the effects of changes in X on equilibrium outcomes.
In particular, we are interested in clarifying why and when an increase in X can actually
lead to a reduction in consumption and/or welfare. The reason we are interested in this
comparative static is that we are interested in knowing why periods of liquidation – that is,
periods where agents have inherited high levels of durable goods from the past – may be
socially painful.
To clarify the analysis, we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that
the matching function takes the form M(N,L) = Λ min{N,L}, with 0 < Λ ≤ 1. The
attractive feature of this matching function is that it has two regimes: one where congestion
externalities are concentrated on workers, and one where the externalities are concentrated
on firms. In the case where N > L, which we refer to as a tight labor market, workers
are the more scarce factor and only the firm matching rate is affected by changes in the
ratio N/L. In the case where L > N , which we refer to as a slack labor market, jobs are
scarce and only the worker matching rate is affected by changes in the ratio N/L. While
this particular matching function is not necessary for our main results, it allows us to cleanly
compare the case where congestion externalities are stronger for firms to the case where they
are stronger for workers. We will also assume that V (a) is piece-wise linear, with V (a) = va
if a ≥ 0 and V (a) = (1 + τ)va if a < 0, where τ > 0 and v > 0. This form of the V (·)
function corresponds to the case discussed in Section 3.2 where the dis-utility of work in the
afternoon is linear. The important element here is τ . In effect, 1 + τ represents the ratio of
the marginal value of an extra unit of assets when one is in debt relative to its value when
one is in surplus. A value of τ > 0 can be justified in many ways, one of which is presented
in Section 3.2. Alternatively, τ > 0 could reflect a financial friction that produces a wedge
between borrowing and saving rates. In what follows, we refer to τ as the “marginal cost of
debt”.
Under these two functional-form assumptions, the equilibrium conditions can be reduced
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to the following:
Λ min{N,L}
L
=
c−X
F ′(`)`
, (9)
Φ =
Λ min{N,L}
N
[F (`)− F ′(`)`], (10)
U ′(c) =
ν ′(`)
F ′(`)
(
1 + τ − Λ min{N,L}
L
τ
)
, (11)
w =
ν ′(`)
v
, (12)
p =
ν ′(`)
vF ′(`)
. (13)
This system of equations now has the feature of being block-recursive, in that equations (9),
(10) and (11) can be solved for c, ` and N , with equations (12) and (13) then providing the
wage and the price. From equations (9) and (11), one may clearly see the complementarity
that can arise between consumption and employment in the case where N < L (i.e., where
the labor market is slack). From (11) we see that, if N < L, agents will tend to increase
their consumption if they believe there are many firms looking for workers (N expected to
be large). Then from equation (9) we see that, to meet anticipated demand, more firms will
need to enter if they believe that consumption will be high, which results in more hiring.
Thus, greater consumption favors greater employment, which in turn reinforces consumption.
This feedback effect arises as the result of consumption and employment playing the role of
strategic complements. Workers demand higher consumption when they believe that many
firms are searching to hire, as they view a high N as reducing their probability of entering the
afternoon in debt. It is important to note that this complementarity argument is implicitly
taking `, the number of hours worked by agents, as fixed. But, in the case where the economy
is characterized by a slack labor market, this is precisely the right equilibrium conjecture.
From (10) we can see that if the labor market is slack, then ` is simply given by `?, the
solution to the equation Λ[F (`?) − F ′ (`?) `?] = Φ, and is therefore locally independent of
X or c. Hence, in the slack labor market regime, consumption and firm hiring will act
as strategic complements. As is common in the case of strategic complements, multiple
equilibria can arise. This possibility is stated in Proposition 1.21
21 The proofs of all propositions are presented in Appendix C.
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Proposition 1. There exists a marginal cost of debt τ¯ > 022 such that (i) if τ < τ¯ , then
there exists a unique equilibrium for any value of the durables stock X; and (ii) if τ > τ¯ ,
then there exists a range of X for which there are multiple equilibria.
While situations with multiple equilibria may be interesting, in this paper we will focus
on cases where the equilibrium is unique. Accordingly, Proposition 1 tells us that our setup
will have a unique equilibrium if the marginal cost of debt is not too large. For the remainder
of this section, we will assume that τ < τ¯ . Proposition 2 focuses on this case and provides
a first step in the characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 2. When τ < τ¯ , there exists an X? such that if X ≤ X? then the equilibrium
is characterized by a tight labor market (N ≥ L), while if X > X? it is characterized by a
slack labor market (N < L). Furthermore, there exists an X?? > X? such that if X > X??,
then employment is zero and agents simply consume their endowment (i.e., c = X).23
The content of Proposition 2 is very intuitive as it simply reflects that when households
have a low endowment of the durable good, they have a high marginal utility. This high
marginal utility leads them to purchase many new goods. The high demand is met by
new firms entering the market, which leads to a tight labor market. In contrast, if the
endowment is high, marginal utility will be low which will reduce the demand for new goods,
thereby creating a slack labor market. In this case, variation in demand induces variation
in entry decisions, and therefore unemployment, because the free-entry condition acts to
create a supply curve for goods that is perfectly elastic. Finally, if X is extremely high, all
trade among agents will stop, as people are content to simply consume their endowment.
Proposition 3 complements Proposition 2 by indicating how consumption is determined in
each regime.
Proposition 3. When the labor market is slack (X?? > X > X?), the level of consumption
is given as the unique solution to
c = U ′−1
(
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
[
1 + τ − c−X
F ′ (`?) `?
τ
])
.
22 τ¯ = −U ′′
(
U ′−1
(
ν′(`?)
F ′(`?)
))
F ′(`?)[F (`?)−Φ]
ν′(`?) .
23 X? = U ′−1
(
ν′(`?)
F ′(`?)
)
− F ′ (`?) `? and X?? = U ′−1
(
ν′(`?)
F ′(`?) (1 + τ)
)
.
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When the labor market is tight (X ≤ X?), consumption is the unique solution to
c = U ′−1
(
ν ′(Ω−1(c−X))
F ′(Ω−1(c−X)) [1 + τ(1− Λ)]
)
.
Finally, when X ≥ X??, consumption is given by c = X.
Given the above propositions, we are now in a position to examine an issue of main
interest, which is how an increase in X affects consumption. In particular, we want to ask
whether an increase in X, which acts as an increase in the available supply of goods, can
lead to a decrease in the actual consumption of goods. Proposition 4 addresses this issue.
Proposition 4. If X?? > X > X?, then consumption c is decreasing in the durables stock
X. If X ≤ X? or X > X??, then c is increasing in X.
The content of Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 2. Proposition 4 indicates that,
starting at X = 0, consumption will continuously increase in X as long as X is compatible
with a tight labor market. Then, when X is greater than X?, the economy enters the slack
labor market regime and consumption starts to decrease as X is increased. Finally, beyond
X?? trade collapses and consumption becomes equal to X and hence it increases with X.
The key result is the existence of a region where total consumption decreases as X in-
creases. The reason why consumption decreases with a higher supply of X in the slack region
is because consumption decisions across households play the role of strategic complements
in this region. Note that, under our current functional form assumptions, an increase in
X leads in partial equilibrium to a one-for-one fall in expenditures, where we define expen-
ditures as e = c − X. If there were no further general-equilibrium effects, the net effect
on consumption would be zero. However, there are general-equilibrium effects, and these
change depending on whether the labor market is tight or slack. When the labor market
is slack, the partial-equilibrium decrease in expenditures reduces the demand for goods as
perceived by firms. Less firms then search for workers, which increases the risk of unem-
ployment. The increase in unemployment risk leads households to cut their expenditures
further, which further amplifies the initial effect of an increase in X on expenditures. It is
because of this multiplier process that an increase in the supply of the good leads to decrease
in its total consumption (X + e). Note that such a negative effect does not happen when
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the labor market is tight, as a decrease in e does not cause an increase in incentives to save,
which is the key mechanism at play causing consumption to fall. It is relevant to note that
when the labor market is slack, both w and p are invariant to changes in X, and hence there
are no general equilibrium effects working though prices in this regime. In contrast, when
the labor market is tight, an increase in X leads to a fall in prices which tends to favor an
increase in consumption. In this sense, the consumption decisions of households play the
role of strategic substitutes when the labor market is tight, so that increased consumption
by one households tends to increase prices which in turn causes other households to decrease
their consumption.
Insert Figure 2
The link noted above between household j’s expenditure, which we can denote by ej =
cj − Xj, and expenditures by other agents in the economy, which we denote by e, can be
captured by rewriting the relations determining ej implied by the elements of Proposition 3
as
ej = Z(e)−X, (14)
with
Z(e) ≡ U ′−1 (Q(e)) (15)
and
Q (e) ≡

ν′(`?)
F ′(`?)
(
1 + τ − τ e
e?
)
if 0 < e < Λe?,
ν′(Ω−1(e))
F ′(Ω−1(e)) [1 + τ(1− Λ)] if e ≥ Λe?.
(16)
Here, e? ≡ Ω(`?) is the level of output (net of firms’ search costs) that would be produced if
all workers were employed, with hours per employed worker equal to `?. In equilibrium we
have the additional requirement that ej = e for all j.
The equilibrium determination of e is illustrated in Figure 3. In the Figure, we plot the
function ej = Z(e) −X for two values of X: a first value of X that places the equilibrium
in the slack labor market regime, and a second value of X that places it in a tight labor
market regime. An equilibrium in this figure corresponds to the point where the function
ej = Z(e)−X crosses the 45◦ line. Note that changes in X simply move the ej = Z(e)−X
curve vertically.
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Insert Figure 3
There are several features to note about Figure 3. First, in the case where X ∈ (X?, X??),
so that the equilibrium of the economy corresponds to a slack labor market with positive
trade (i.e., 0 < e < Λe?), the diagram is similar to a Keynesian cross. We can see graphically
how an increase in X by one unit shifts down the Z(e) − X curve and, since the slope
of Z(e) − X is positive and less than one, a multiplier process kicks in that causes e to
fall by more than one. Because of this multiplier process, total consumption of durables,
which is equal to e + X, decreases, which is the essence of the first part of Proposition 4.
Second, when X < X?, so that the labor market is tight (i.e., the equilibrium is such that
e > Λe?), the diagram is different from the Keynesian cross. The most notable difference
is the negative slope of the function Z(e) − X for values of e > e?. This reflects the fact
that unemployment risk is not increasing in this regime. In fact, when X is sufficiently small
so that the labor market is tight, an increase in X by one unit leads to a decrease in e
that is less than one, compared to a decrease of greater than one as exhibited in the slack
regime. Here, expenditure by others plays the role of a strategic substitute with one’s own
expenditure – as opposed to playing the role of a strategic complement as is the case in the
unemployment regime – through its effects on real wages and prices. Accordingly, in this
region, an increase in X leads to an increase in total consumption of durables. Another more
subtle difference with the Keynesian cross is in how the intercept of Z(e)−X is determined.
The intercept is given by U ′−1( ν
′(`?)
F ′(`?)(1 + τ)) − X. The X term in the intercept can be
interpreted as capturing a pure aggregate-demand effect, whereby higher values of X reduce
aggregate demand. However, the remaining term, U ′−1( ν
′(`?)
F ′(`?)(1 + τ)), reflects technology
and preferences. In particular, we can generalize this term by re-introducing the technology
parameter θ, in which case the intercept becomes U ′−1( ν
′(`?)
θF ′(`?)(1 + τ)).
24 In this case, we see
that an improvement in technology shifts up the intercept, and will lead to an increase in
expenditures. This feature of the Z(e) − X curve illustrates its equilibrium nature, which
incorporates both demand and supply effects, as opposed to a Keynesian cross that only
reflects demand effects.
24 Recall that an increase in θ is associated with a proportional change in the search cost, so that `?
remains unchanged.
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3.4 Is There Deficient Demand When the Labor Market is Slack?
In the case where X is large enough for the economy to be in the slack labor market regime
(X? < X < X??), we would like to establish whether this regime should be characterized
as suffering from deficient aggregate demand. For this, we need to first define the concept
of deficient demand. In our definition we want to focus on a situation where economic
activity is inefficiently low and where that low level of activity can be traced back to a lack
of demand by others. In particular, we want our definition to exclude a situation where
economic activity is inefficiently low simply because of price distortions that are unrelated
to a lack of demand by others. For this reason, we define deficient demand as follows.
Definition. Deficient demand is a situation where increased demand by one agent would
favor increased demand by other agents, and where a coordinated increased in demand by all
agents would leave everyone better off.
Using this definition, Proposition 5 indicates that the slack labor market regime is in fact
characterized by deficient demand, while the full employment regime is not.
Proposition 5. When the labor market is slack (X? < X < X??) it exhibits deficient
demand for all τ > 0, while if the labor market is tight (X < X?) the economy does not
exhibit deficient demand.
3.5 Effects of Changes in X on Welfare
We have shown that when X is high enough, then the labor market will be slack and a local
increase in X will cause consumption to fall. We now want to ask how expected welfare is
affected in this case, where expected welfare is defined as
U(c) + µ [−ν(`) + V (w`− p(c−X))] + (1− µ)V (−p(c−X)).
In particular, we want to ask whether welfare can decrease when the economy is endowed
with more goods. Proposition 6 answers this question in the affirmative. Proposition 6
actually goes a step further and indicates two sufficient conditions for there to exist a range
of X in the slack labor market regime where an increase in X leads to a fall in welfare.
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Proposition 6. An increase in X can lead to a fall in expected welfare. In particular, if
either (i) τ is close enough to τ¯ or (ii) the average cost of work ν(`
?)
`?
is low enough relative
to the marginal cost of work ν ′(`?), then there is always a range of X ∈ [X?, X??] such that
an increase in X leads to a decrease in expected welfare.
Proposition 6 provides an answer to whether more goods can make everyone worse off.
In effect, the proposition indicates that the economy can function in a very perverse fashion
when households have inherited many goods. We saw from Proposition 4 that an increase
in X always leads to a decrease in consumption when the economy is in the slack regime.
In comparison, Proposition 6 is weaker as it only indicates the possibility of a fall in welfare
in the slack region when X rises. In response to a rise in X in the slack regime, there are
three distinct channels through which expected welfare is affected. First, as discussed above,
consumption falls, which tends to directly decrease welfare. Second, this fall in consumption
is associated with a fall in the probability of being employed. It can be verified that the net
benefit of being employed is strictly positive, so that this second effect also tends to decrease
welfare. Finally, a rise in X means that a given quantity of consumption can be obtained
with a lower level of expenditure, which increases assets for the employed and decreases debt
for the unemployed, and therefore tends to increase welfare. Whether this final effect is
outweighed by the first two depends on the factors discussed in Proposition 6.
3.6 Adding a Non-Durable Goods Sector in the Morning Period
In the previous section we showed that when trade in goods and labor is not simultaneous
and there is risk of unemployment, the economy can function in a rather perverse fashion.
In particular, we showed that inheriting a large amount of goods can result in deficient
demand, with increases in inherited goods reducing both consumption and welfare. In this
section we want to briefly explore the robustness of these results to allowing for a second
sector in the morning that can potentially expand when the market for durables contracts.
This exploration is especially relevant given a common criticism of the liquidation view of
recessions, as expressed for example by Krugman [1998], that suggests that liquidationist
models cannot explain why we see falls in the consumption of both durable and non-durable
goods during most recessions. In order to explore this issue, let us extend the previous
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setup by making a few small changes. First, let us allow morning utility to take the form
Ud(cd)+Un(cn)−ν(`), where cd is durable consumption and is equal as before to X+e, cn is
the added morning non-durable consumption good, and ` is hours worked. We will assume
that there is only one labor market, so that workers can switch frictionlessly across sectors
of production. Both durable goods producers and non-durable goods producers will search
for workers in this labor market. The markets for durable goods and non-durable goods are
assumed to be distinct, with each functioning in a Walrasian fashion. We treat producers
of the different goods symmetrically, with production functions in the respective sectors
denoted by F d(`) and F n(`) (maintaining the assumptions that F s′(`)` is increasing in ` in
both sectors s ∈ {d, n}), and assuming that both types of firms face the fixed cost of entering
the market given by Φ. Otherwise, we maintain the same structure as before, including the
functional-form assumptions for M(N,L) and V (·). The issue we want to examine is the
relationship between X and equilibrium outcomes for this economy. Proposition 7 establishes
this.
Proposition 7. In the economy with both a durable good and a non-durable good in the
morning, if τ is not too large, then for any value of X > 0 there exists a unique equilibrium.
Moreover, if Φ is not too small, there exists an X? and an X?? > X?, such that:
(i) For X < X?, the labor market is tight and the consumption of both durables (cd = X+e)
and non-durables (cn) increases with X.
(ii) For X ∈ [X?, X??], the labor market is slack with both cd and cn decreasing with X.
(iii) For X > X??, cd = X and cn is invariant to X.
The most interesting aspect of this proposition from our point of view is the existence
of a slack labor market regime (when X ∈ [X?, X??]), where the consumption of durables,
purchases of new durables, and purchases of non-durables all decrease in response to an
increase in X. Although workers can be hired by non-durable goods firms in response to
an increase in X, the proposition tells us that this substitution does not happen when the
labor market is slack. To understand why this does not arise, it is helpful to examine the
equilibrium conditions in the case where the labor market is slack, which can be combined
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to obtain
Ud′
(
cd
)
=
ν ′
(
`d?
)
F d′ (`d?)
[
1 + τ −
(
cd −X
F d′ (`d?) `d?
+
cn
F d′ (`n?) `n?
)
τ
]
, (17)
Ud′ (cn) =
ν ′ (`n?)
F n′ (`n?)
[
1 + τ −
(
cd −X
F d′ (`d?) `d?
+
cn
F d′ (`n?) `n?
)
τ
]
, (18)
where `d?and `n? (hours worked in the unemployment regime) are defined implicitly by the
conditions Λ[F n(`d?)− F n′(`d?)`d?] = Φ and Λ[F n(`n?)− F n′(`n?)`n?] = Φ.
From equations (17) and (18), we see that when the labor market is slack consumption in
the two sectors act as strategic complements, and therefore they move in the same direction
in response to a change in X. As long as X is high enough to push the labor market into
slack, any further increase in X decreases employment in the durable goods sector, which
increases overall unemployment risk. Since this initial increase in unemployment risk causes
households to hold back on all of their purchases, demand for both durable and non-durable
goods falls, further increasing unemployment risk, and so on. Hence, this version of the model
offers an explanation for why inheriting a high level of durables can lead to low activity in
both the durable and non-durable goods sectors.25
3.7 Adding a Collateral Constraint
In the previous sections we have illustrated how high levels of inherited durable goods can
depress the economy and create a situation of deficient demand. The effects emphasized
in the model run in the opposite direction of those emphasized in much of the literature
on collateral constraints, wherein higher levels of capital may relax such constraints and
favor expenditure by households. In this section we briefly explore how adding a collateral
constraint to our model changes the characterization of equilibrium outcomes.
Recall that households in our model were allowed to debit their bank account in order
to buy goods in the morning market without any limitations. Now suppose we return to
25 A key condition for the unemployment regime to emerge with high X is that Φ not be too small.
Specifically, we require that the value of cn that solves
Ud′(cn) =
ν′(`n?)
Fn′(`n?)
[
1 + τ − c
n
F d′(`n?)`n?
τ
]
be such that c
n
Fd′(`n?)`n? < Λ. This property is guaranteed if Φ is large enough.
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our baseline model (without non-durable goods in the morning) and change it along the
several dimensions. First, let us assume that inherited capital goods X also give utility in
the afternoon period.26 Second, we allow creditors to seize capital if debt is not repaid in the
afternoon. Third, we assume that a fraction τ ? > τ of capital is lost when transferring it to a
creditor in payment of debt.27 In this case, a collateral constraint of the form (1 + τ)pe ≤ X
will guarantee that households honor their obligations. How does the presence of such a
constraint affect how a change in X impacts economic activity? Proposition 8 provides an
answer to this question.
Proposition 8. In the presence of a collateral constraint of the form (1 + τ)pe ≤ X, there
exist X+ and X++ satisfying 0 < X+ ≤ X++ < X?? such that equilibrium outcomes are
characterized by
(i) If X++ < X < X??, then the labor market is slack, there is deficient demand and
∂c
∂X
< 0.
(ii) If 0 < X < X+, then the labor market is slack and ∂c
∂X
> 1.
Proposition 8 indicates that the presence of a collateral constraint causes the effect of X
on c to become richer when compared to the baseline model. In particular, if X is not too
large (0 < X < X+), then, despite high desired consumption, the economy will now exhibit
unemployment because the binding collateral constraint limits the amount that households
can actually purchase. In this situation, consumption is highly positively responsive to an
increase in X, since this relaxes the credit constraint. There is not a coordination problem
in this regime, since an increase in the demand of others has no effect on a household’s
collateral constraint. This regime did not arise in our baseline model. In contrast, when X
is high enough (X++ < X < X??), we once again find that more X leads to less consumption
because of the multiplier process discussed previously. In this region, even though agents
have enough collateral to spend more, their purchases are still inefficiently low since they do
not internalize the effect that their purchasing decisions have on others. It is interesting to
26 Utility in the afternoon is now given by U˜ (X + c˜) − v˜`, where c˜ is the amount of the afternoon good
that is consumed by the household and ˜` is the labor used to produce services.
27 The assumption that τ? > τ guarantees that agents will pay back their debts by working more instead
of defaulting.
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note that we could have X+ = X++, in which case the labor market would always be slack,
but the reasons for high unemployment would be very different depending on whether X were
high or low. If it were low, unemployment would be high because agents would be limited
in how much they can borrow in order to purchase goods that would create employment.
In contrast, if X were high, unemployment would be high not because of limited access to
credit, but because of the low initial impetus to go out and buy new goods.
4 Dynamics
In this section we explore a dynamic extension of our static model in which morning con-
sumption contributes to the accumulation of X. In particular, we want to consider the case
where the evolution of X obeys the accumulation equation
Xt+1 = (1− δ)Xt + γet 0 < δ ≤ 1 , 0 < γ ≤ 1− δ, (19)
where the parameter γ represents the fraction of morning consumption expenditures, et =
ct−Xt, that enters the stock of durable goods. Since we do not want to allow heterogeneity
between individuals to expand over time, we allow individuals to borrow and lend only within
a period but not across periods; in other words, households are allowed to spend more than
their income in the morning, but must repay any resulting debt in the afternoon of the same
period. The problem facing a household in the morning of a period is therefore to choose how
many durables to buy and, conditional on a match, how much labor to supply. We model the
afternoon of a period as in Section 3.2, where households use labor to produce services either
for their own consumption or, at a level of productivity that is lower by a factor 1+τ , for the
consumption of others. In each afternoon, then, the household chooses how many services to
consume and to produce to both satisfy its needs and to pay back any accumulated debt. In
order to keep the model very tractable, we will continue to assume that dis-utility of work in
the afternoon of a period is linear (i.e., equal to v˜`). Under this assumption, all households
will choose the same level of consumption of services in each afternoon, while the production
of services will vary across households depending on whether they enter the afternoon in
debt or in surplus. Since there are no interesting equilibrium interactions in afternoons, we
can maintain most of our focus on equilibrium outcomes in the sequence of morning periods.
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Relative to the static case, the only difference in equilibrium relationships (aside from
the addition of the accumulation equation (19)) is that the first-order condition associated
with the household’s choice of consumption is now given by the Euler equation
U ′ (Xt + et)−Q (et) = β [(1− δ − γ)U ′ (Xt+1 + et+1)− (1− δ)Q (et+1)] , (20)
where Q is as defined in equation (16). In this dynamic setting, an equilibrium will be
represented as a sequence of the previous equilibrium conditions (9), (10), (12) and (13),
plus the accumulation equation (19) and the Euler equation (20).
There are many complications that arise in the dynamic version of this model, which
makes characterizing equilibrium behavior more difficult. In particular, there can be multiple
equilibrium paths and multiple steady-state solutions. Luckily, the problem can be simplified
if we focus on cases where δ is small; that is, on cases where the durability of goods is high.
In addition to simplifying the analysis, focusing on the low-δ case appears reasonable to us,
as many consumer durables are long-lived, especially if we include housing in that category.
In the case where δ is sufficiently small, as stated in Proposition 9, the economy will have
only one steady state and that steady state will have the property that the labor market will
be slack.
Proposition 9. If δ is sufficiently small, then the model has a unique steady state and this
steady state is characterized by a slack labor market.
Proposition 9 is very useful, as it will allow us to analyze the equilibrium behavior around
the unique steady state. Accordingly, for the remainder of this section, we will assume that
δ is sufficiently small so that Proposition 9 applies.
4.1 Local Dynamics
In this subsection, we explore the local dynamics assuming that δ is small enough that the
steady state is unique and in the slack labor market regime. The first question we address is
whether equilibrium dynamics can exhibit local indeterminacy. In other words, can forward-
looking behavior give rise to an additional potential local source of multiple equilibria in our
setup? Proposition 10 indicates that this is not possible; that is, the roots of the system
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around the unique steady state can not both be smaller than one.28
Proposition 10. The local dynamics around the steady state can either exhibit monotonic
convergence in c and X, convergence with oscillations, or divergence. Locally indeterminacy
is not possible.
Proposition 10 is useful as it tells us that the decision rule for consumption around the
steady state is a function.29 Accordingly, we can now examine the sign of the derivative of
this function; that is, whether the decision rule for consumption around the steady state has
the property that a larger X leads to a lower level of consumption, as was the case in our
static model when in the slack labor market regime. Proposition 11 indicates that if τ is not
too large, then local dynamics will exhibit this property. Note that the condition on τ is a
sufficient condition only.
Proposition 11. If τ is sufficiently small, then in a neighborhood of the unique steady state,
consumption is decreasing in X, with the dynamics for X converging monotonically to the
steady state.
From Proposition 11 we now know that, as long as τ is not too big, our model has the
property that when the economy has over-accumulated relative to the steady state (i.e., if X
slightly exceeds its steady-state value), then consumption will be lower than in the steady
state throughout the transition period, which we may refer to as a period of liquidation. In
this sense, the economy is overreacting to its inherited excess of capital goods during this
liquidation period, since it is reducing its expenditures to such an extent that people are
consuming less even though there are more goods available to them in the economy. While
such a response is not socially optimal, it remains unclear whether it is so excessive as to
make people worse off in comparison to the steady state, since they are also working less
during the liquidation phase. It turns out that, as in the static case, the welfare effect of
such a liquidation period depends, among other things, on whether the average dis-utility
28 In this section we only consider local dynamics around a unique unemployment-regime steady state.
Nonetheless, it is straightforward to show that if the unique steady state is in the full-employment regime,
then the local dynamics necessarily exhibit monotonic convergence.
29 This is a slight abuse of language since Proposition 10 does not rule out the existence of other equilibrium
paths away from the steady state.
29
of work is small enough relative to the marginal dis-utility. For example, if the average
dis-utility of work is sufficiently low relative to its marginal value, then it can be verified
that a liquidation period induced by inheriting an excess of X will make average utility in all
periods of the transition lower than the steady-state level. This result depends in addition
on the unemployment rate not being too large in the steady state.
While we do not have a simple characterization of the global dynamics of the model,
Propositions 10 and 11 suggest that, starting from X = 0, the economy will likely go though
a phase with a tight labor market, with both X and c increasing over time. The economy
then enters into a range with a slack labor market once X is large enough. Then, as long
as τ is not too great, X will continue to monotonically increase, converging toward its
steady state. In contrast to X, upon entering the slack regime, consumption starts to
decrease as unemployment risk increases and causes household’s to hold back on purchases,
which further depresses activity. Eventually, the economy will reach a steady state where
consumption, employment, and possibly period welfare are below the peak levels reached
during the transition.
4.2 A Quantitative Model of Booms and Busts with Irrational
Exuberance
In this section, we illustrate the possibility of generating boom-bust cycles with the type
of mechanism that we have put forward. In particular, we evaluate the model’s ability to
match the suggestive evidence presented in Section 2. As mentioned earlier, our aim is not
to propose a novel explanation as to why the economy may embark on periods of rapid
accumulation that turn out to be ex post excessive. Possible explanations could be noisy
news, financial shocks (which could be modeled as changes in the marginal cost of debt, τ ,
in our model), uncertainty, waves of optimism, etc. For the purposes of illustration, in this
section we suppose that the economy randomly undergoes episodes of excessive optimism
about the growth of the economy, which we call irrational exuberance.
To derive some quantitative implications, we make several functional-form assumptions
and then calibrate the model to reproduce salient features of the U.S. postwar business
cycle. The model is written in per capita terms, and the length of a period is taken to be a
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quarter. We assume that the period utility and production functions are given, respectively,
by log(c)− ν `1+ω
1+ω
and θtA`
α, where total factor productivity θt follows a deterministic trend
with growth rate γθ. On top of the parameters ν, ω, A, γθ and α, we need to calibrate the
discount factor β, the depreciation rate δ, the share of durable goods in total expenditure
γ, the vacancy-posting cost Φ, the marginal cost of debt τ , and the number of participating
workers L.
We set γθ = 1.0048 to match average per capita GDP growth and normalize θ0 to 1. We
set the discount factor to the commonly chosen level β = 0.99. We interpret X as the stock of
durable goods. Expenditures on durable goods are on average over the postwar period 8.5%
of total expenditures, so that we set γ = 0.085.30 Similarly, the depreciation rate is calibrated
to the the average ratio of “Current-Cost Depreciation of Consumer Durable Goods” over
the “Current-Cost Net Stock of Consumer Durable Goods”, so that δ = 0.045. We set
α = 2/3 to obtain a labor income share of 2/3. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply in the
intensive margin ω is set to 0.5 following Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber [2011]. A and
L are normalized to one. ν and Φ are then set to target the postwar average unemployment
rate of 6% and to yield the normalized level of hours per capita ` = 1.
Episodes of irrational exuberance are modeled in the following way. The economy can be
either in normal times or in an episode of exuberance, but actual TFP always grows at factor
γθ. In normal times, actual growth is correctly anticipated by economic agents when making
spending decisions. With probability 1 − p1, the economy remains in the normal regime
in the subsequent period, while with probability p1 it enters into an episode of irrational
exuberance. When the economy is exuberant, agents initially optimistically believe that
TFP grew at a higher-than-usual factor κγθ from last period, where κ > 1 measures the
degree of optimism. Shoppers make their purchase decisions according to this optimistic
belief. On the other hand, upon entering the labor market workers learn the true level of
TFP and receive a wage commensurate with it. Accordingly, households “overspend” and
“overborrow” in the morning, thereby “overaccumulating” the durable good X. When in an
30 We interpret consumption in the model as reflecting both the services from existing durable goods, plus
the felicity from current expenditures, where current expenditures can be on both durable and non-durable
goods. For this reason, we set γ < (1 − δ), which implies that agents know that only a fraction γ of these
expenditures will become durable goods.
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exuberant period, the economy remains exuberant into the next period with probability p2,
and returns to normal with probability 1 − p2. Given the mechanisms of our model, when
the economy returns to normal times it does so with a high stock of durable goods X, which
is the main force that triggers a recession.31 The simulated model will thus feature booms
and busts, even though actual TFP never deviates from trend.
There are four parameters that are specific to our model and shock structure that cannot
be taken from the literature: the marginal cost of debt parameter τ , the level of optimism
in irrational exuberance episodes κ, and the transition probabilities p1 and p2. We calibrate
these parameters to match four moments of the U.S. business cycle:32 the standard deviation
of output growth (0.96%), the average depth of a recession (-2.9%), the average length of a
recovery (6 quarters) and the number of recession episodes per 100 quarters (3.3 episodes)
(see Table 2).33 Using this procedure, the calibrated values of the parameters are as follows.
The degree of optimism is κ = 1.22, meaning that in an optimistic quarter, agents believe
that the growth rate of TFP is 0.585% instead of the average rate of 0.48%. The marginal
cost of debt is given by τ = 0.065. The probability of entering into an optimistic episode
is p1 = 0.3, and the probability of remaining in an exuberant episode is p2 = 0.48. With
this calibration, exuberant episodes last for an average of two quarters, and it takes at least
three quarters of exuberance to produce a recession.34
Insert Table 2
Next, using data simulated from our calibrated model, we perform the same empirical
analysis conducted on actual data in Section 2: we compute cumulated investment, and
31 An alternative way to model over-optimistic beliefs would be to assume rational (Bayesian) learning
by economic agents in an environment with permanent and transitory shocks to TFP and/or noisy signals,
as in, for example Beaudry and Portier [2004], Jaimovich and Rebelo [2009] or Blanchard, L’Huillier, and
Lorenzoni [2013] (see Beaudry and Portier [2014] for a survey of this literature). Because the reaction of
the economy to excessive accumulation in our model is quite independent of the precise mechanism that
generates optimistic episodes, we adopt here the analytically simpler approach of irrational exuberance.
32 To obtain moments for the model we average the relevant statistics from 10,000 simulations of the model
of 270 quarters each in length.
33 To detect peaks and troughs, we use Harding and Pagan’s [2002] version of Bry and Boschan’s [1971]
algorithm, as provided by James Engel. Episodes of decreasing output are classified as recessions if total
output growth is smaller than -2% in total.
34 Recall that a recession is an episode in which output per capita decreases. Given the secular trend in
TFP, under our calibration short periods of exuberance generate negative deviations from trend output per
capita, but not a negative growth rate.
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obtain the correlations between it and both the depth of recessions and the length of re-
coveries. Note that neither of these correlations were targeted in the calibration exercise.
Nonetheless, as shown in Table 2, the model does a very good job at matching both of these
moments.35 As an illustration, Figure 4 shows scatter plots of depth and length against
cumulated investment for a typical simulation of our model.
Insert Figure 4
To illustrate the mechanism at play in a boom-bust cycle driven by irrational exuberance,
Figure 5 displays the path of an economy that is on a balanced growth path until period 4,
and then, beginning in period 5, enters into an 8-quarter episode of exuberance. As shown
in the upper panel of the figure, GDP, as measured by total expenditure, increases faster
and above trend during the exuberance episode, which translates into a corresponding over-
accumulation of durable goods (lower panel). When agents realize their error in period 12,
they cut back on their expenditure to start a liquidation process.36
Insert Figure 5
5 Dynamic Policy Trade-Offs
In this final section, we turn to one of our motivating questions and ask whether or not
stimulative policies should be used when an economy is going through a liquidation phase
characterized by high unemployment. In particular, we consider the case where the economy
has inherited from the past a level of X above its steady-state value and, in the absence of in-
tervention, would experience a period of liquidation, with consumption below its steady-state
level throughout the transition. Obviously, the first-best policy in this environment would
be to remove the sources of frictions or to perfectly insure agents against unemployment
risk. However, for reasons such as adverse selection or moral hazard, such first-best policies
35 Note that, since TFP in the model does not fluctuate around its trend, controlling for TFP growth will
have no impact, just as we found in the data (Table 1 in Section 2).
36 In Appendix G, we study the pattern of fluctuations generated by a simple RBC model subject to irra-
tional exuberance shocks. Periods of optimism are associated with high levels of activity but low investment,
so that cumulated investment is below trend at the onset of a recession, and its correlation with depth of
recessions and length of recoveries is negative. We also model the case of TFP shocks, and show that those
correlations are small and insignificant.
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may not be possible. We therefore consider the value of a more limited type of policy: one
that seeks only to temporarily boost expenditures. In particular, we are interested in asking
whether welfare would be increased by stimulating expenditures for one period, knowing that
this would imply a higher X (and therefore lower consumption) in all subsequent periods,
thereby prolonging the recession. This question is aimed at capturing the tension between
the Keynesian and Hayekian policy prescriptions discussed earlier.37
In order to understand the policy we are considering, recall that the law of motion for X
is given by
Xt+1 = (1− δ)Xt + γe(Xt), 0 < γ < 1− δ,
where the function e(Xt) is the equilibrium policy function for et. Now, beginning from
steady state, suppose at t = 0 we stimulate expenditures by  for one period such that the
stock at t = 1 is now given by
X˜1 = (1− δ)X0 + γ [e(X0) + ] .
As as result of this one-period stimulus, the path of expenditures for all subsequent periods
will be changed even if there is no further policy intervention. The new sequence for X,
which we denote X˜t, will be given by X˜t+1 = (1 − δ)X˜t + γe(X˜t) for all t ≥ 1. We now
examine the effect on welfare of such a policy. To do so, we focus on the case where the
steady state of the system is stable and δ is sufficiently small that the labor market is slack
at the steady state. In this case, we have the following result.
Proposition 12. Suppose the economy is undergoing a liquidation (i.e., X, and therefore
the unemployment rate, are above the steady state). Then a small temporary stimulus will
increase welfare even though it delays the return of unemployment to its steady state level.
Proposition 12 indicates that when the economy is experiencing a liquidation, a one-
period policy of stimulating household expenditures can increase welfare even though it
postpones the recovery. This arises because the gain in utility coming from the initial
37 In answering this question, we will be examining the effects of such a policy without needing to be
very explicit about the precise policy tools used to engineer the stimulus, which could come from a number
of different sources. For example, the stimulus we consider could be engineered by a one-period subsidy to
consumption financed by a tax on the employed.
34
stimulus is greater than the loss in utility associated with a more prolonged recession. With
respect to the policy debate between the followers of Hayek and Keynes, we take the results
from Proposition 12 as indicating that Hayek may have been right to emphasize the cost of
stimulus policies in terms of prolonging a recession, but it may nevertheless still be desirable
to stimulate demand in such a case – at least by a small amount– since in the absence of
intervention the market outcome will tend to generate a recession that is excessively deep.
6 Conclusion
There are three elements that motivated us to write this paper. First, there is the observation
that many recessions arise after periods of fast accumulation of capital goods, either in
the form of houses, consumer durables, or productive capital. This, in our view, gives
plausibility to the hypothesis that recessions may often reflect periods of liquidation where
the economy is trying to deplete excesses from past over-accumulation.38,39 Second, during
these apparent liquidation-driven recessions, the process of adjustment seems to be socially
painful and excessive, in the sense that the level of unemployment does not seem to be
consistent with the idea that the economy is simply “taking a vacation” after excessive past
work. Instead, the economy seems to be exhibiting some coordination failure that makes
the exploitation of gains from trade between individuals more difficult than in normal times.
These two observations capture the tension we believe is often associated with the Hayekian
and Keynesian views of recessions. Finally, even when monetary authorities try to counter
such recessions by easing policy, this does not seem to be sufficent to eliminate the problem.
This leads us to believe that there are likely mechanisms at play beyond those related to
nominal rigidities. Hence, our objective in writing this paper was to offer a framework that
is consistent with these three observations, and accordingly to provide an environment where
the policy trade-offs inherent to the Hayekian and Keynesian views could be discussed.
A central contribution of the paper is to provide a simple macro model that explains
38 Note that this is a fundamentalist view of recessions, in that the main cause of a recession is viewed as an
objective fundamental (in this case, the level of capital relative to technology) rather than a sunspot-driven
change in beliefs.
39 An alternative interpretation of this observation is that financial imbalances associated with the increase
in capital goods are the main source of the subsequent recessions.
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why an economy may become particularly inefficient when it inherits an excessive amount of
capital goods from the past. The narrative behind the mechanism is quite straightforward.
When the economy inherits a high level of capital, this decreases the desire for trade be-
tween agents in the economy, leading to less demand. When there are fixed costs associated
with employment, this will generally lead to an increase in unemployment. If the risk of
unemployment cannot be entirely insured away, households will react to the increased un-
employment by limiting purchases and thereby further depressing demand. This multiplier
process will cause an excess reaction to the inherited goods and can be large enough to make
society worse off even if – in a sense – it is richer since it has inherited a large stock of goods.
Within this framework, we have shown that policies aimed at stimulating activity will face
an unpleasant trade-off, as the main effect of stimulus will simply be to postpone the ad-
justment process. Nonetheless, we find that such stimulative policies may remain desirable
even if they postpone recovery.
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Appendix
A Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Depth of Recession and Length of Recovery vs. Cumulated Total Investment
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Note: Horizontal axis is capital over-accumulation, measured as cumulated per capita investment over previ-
ous 10 years, detrended using a cubic trend. Vertical axis is either depth of recession, measured as percentage
fall in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, or length of recovery, measured as the number of
quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach its previous peak. Dates correspond to peak quarters.
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Figure 2: Consumption as Function of X
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α, with parameters ω = 1, ν = 0.5, α = 0.67, A = 1, Φ = 0.35,
Λ = 1 and τ = 0.4.
Figure 3: Equilibrium Determination
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α, with parameters ω = 1, ν = 0.5, α = 0.67, A = 1, Φ = 0.35,
Λ = 1 and τ = 0.4. Values of X used were X = 0 for the full-employment equilibrium
and X = 0.69 for the unemployment equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Depth of Recession and Length of Recovery vs. Cumulated Total Investment in
One Simulation of The Irrational Exuberance Model
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Note: Horizontal axis is capital accumulation, measured as cumulated per capita investment over previous
10 years, detrended using a cubic trend. Vertical axis is either depth of recession, measured as percentage
difference in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, or length of recovery, measured as the
number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach its previous peak.
Figure 5: An Episode of Irrational Exhuberance
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Note: Dashed line represents the path of the variable along the balanced growth path. Solid line is associated
with an 8-quarter episode of irrational exuberance starting in period 5. During this episode, agents believe
that the TFP growth rate is 0.585% per quarter instead of 0.48%. e represents total expenditures on goods,
and X is the stock of durables. See the text for functional forms and parameter calibration.
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Table 1: The Relation Between Depth of Recession or Length of Recovery and Cumulated
Investment for US Postwar Recessions
Dep. Variable : Depth of recession
Measure of capital : Tot. Capital Resid. Capital N-Res. Capital Dur. Goods
Equation : (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
constant 3.01 3.22 4.41 3.94 3.50 3.71 3.08 3.19
(0.06) (0.09) (0.01) (0.04) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13)
ĉit 0.94 0.97 0.48 0.48 0.82 0.96 0.74 0.75
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.17) (0.03) (0.05)
∆tfp - -0.19 - 0.30 - -0.42 - -0.10
- (0.76) - (0.63) - (0.65) - (0.89)
Dep. Variable : Length of Recovery
Measure of capital : Tot. Capital Resid. Capital N-Res. Capital Dur. Goods
Equation : (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
constant 0.63 0.88 1.33 1.34 0.63 0.84 0.47 0.70
(0.19) (0.10) (0.02) (0.08) (0.38) (0.21) (0.25) (0.11)
ĉit 0.40 0.43 0.17 0.17 0.42 0.56 0.36 0.38
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
∆tfp - -0.22 - -0.01 - -0.42 - -0.20
- (0.25) - (0.98) - (0.14) - (0.19)
Notes: Capital is measured as cumulated per capita investment over previous 10 years, detrended
using a cubic trend. Dependent variable is either depth of recession, measured as percentage differ-
ence in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, or length of recovery, measured as the
number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach its previous peak. TFP is Fernald’s
[2014] series which has been corrected for utilization. Numbers in parentheses are p-values.
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Table 2: Targeted and Non-Targeted Moments
Moment Data Model
Targeted Moments
s.d of output growth 0.96% 0.95%
Average depth of a recession -2.9% -3.0%
Average length of a recovery (quarters) 6 5.7
Number of recession episodes (per 100 quarters) 3.3 3.3
Non-Targeted Moments
corr(ci,length) 0.77 0.78
corr(ci,depth) 0.85 0.87
Note: “Data” refers to postwar US data, and “Model” to 10,000 simulations of our model of 270 quarters
each. ci stands for capital accumulation, measured as cumulated per capita investment over previous 10
years, detrended using a cubic trend. “Depth” represents the depth of recession, measured as percentage
difference in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, and “length” is the length of recovery,
measured as the number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach its previous peak. In the model
simulations, peaks and troughs are detected using Harding and Pagan’s [2002] version of Bry and Boschan’s
[1971] algorithm.
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B Data
In sections 2 and 4.2, we use a sample that runs from 1947Q1 to 2015Q2. Series definitions are:
- Peaks and troughs dates are taken from the NBER website.
- Population : FRED, Total Population: All Ages including Armed Forces Overseas (POP),
Thousands, Quarterly, Not Seasonally Adjusted, starts in 1952. For 1948 to 1952, we use
log linearly interpolated annual data from the Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
downloaded: 01/2016.
- Output: BEA, Table 1.1.4. for nominal level and 1.1.5. for price index, Gross Domestic
Product, real level constructed as nominal level divided by price index, 1947Q1-2015Q2,
seasonally adjusted, downloaded: 01/2016.
- Durable goods: BEA, Table 1.1.4. for nominal level and 1.1.5. for price index, Gross Domestic
Product, real level constructed as nominal level divided by price index, 1947Q1-2015Q2,
seasonally adjusted, downloaded: 01/2016.
- Non Residential Investment: BEA, Table 1.1.4. for nominal level and 1.1.5. for price index,
Gross Domestic Product, real level constructed as nominal level divided by price index,
1947Q1-2015Q2, seasonally adjusted, downloaded: 01/2016.
- Residential Investment: BEA, Table 1.1.4. for nominal level and 1.1.5. for price index, Gross
Domestic Product, real level constructed as nominal level divided by price index, 1947Q1-
2015Q2, seasonally adjusted, downloaded: 01/2016.
- Fixed Investment: BEA, Table 1.1.4. for nominal level and 1.1.5. for price index, Gross
Domestic Product, real level constructed as nominal level divided by price index, 1947Q1-
2015Q2, seasonally adjusted, downloaded: 01/2016.
- Total Investment: BEA, Table 1.1.4. for nominal level and 1.1.5. for price index, computed
as the sum of real fixed investment and real consumption in durable goods, 1947Q1-2015Q2,
seasonally adjusted, downloaded: 01/2016.
- TFP: Utilization-adjusted quarterly-TFP series for the U.S. Business Sector, produced by
John Fernald, series ID: dtfp util, 1947Q1-2015Q2, downloaded: 01/2016.
- Depreciation rates for consumer durables, fixed, residential and non residential investment:
computed as the average of the ratio Current-Cost Depreciation of Fixed Assets and Con-
sumer Durable Goods / Current-Cost Net Stock of Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable
Goods, over 1948-2014 using annual data, BEA, Tables 1.1. and 1.3, downloaded: 01/2016.
- Unemployment : Civilian Unemployment Rate, Percent, Annual, Seasonally Adjusted (UNRATE),
FRED database, 1948Q1-2015Q1, downloaded: 01/2016.
Denoting iXt real investment of quarter t, where X is either consumer durables, fixed, non
residential and residential and δX the depreciation rate, cumulated investment ciXt between t and
t− T + 1 is computed as ciXt =
∑T−1
j=0 δ
j
XiXt−j .
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C Proofs of Propositions
For simplicity, when the matching function is of the form M(N,L) = Λ min{N,L} we prove results
only for the case where Λ = 1. It is straightforward to extend all proofs to the more general case.
Proof of Proposition 1
We first establish that there always exists an equilibrium of this model. Substituting equation (9)
into equation (11) and letting e ≡ c−X yields
U ′(X + e) =
ν ′(`)
F ′(`)
(
1 + τ − τ e
Ω(`)
)
, (C.1)
where Ω(`) ≡ F ′(`)`, which is assumed to be strictly increasing. When N < L, equation (10) implies
that ` = `?, and equation (9) implies that e < e?, where e? ≡ Ω(`?). On the other hand, when
N > L, equation (9) implies that ` = Ω−1(e). Further, since min{N,L} < N and F (`)− F ′(`)` is
strictly increasing in `, equation (10) implies that ` > `?, and thus, by strict increasingness of Ω, we
also have e > e?. Substituting these results into equation (C.1) yields that e > 0 is an equilibrium
of this model if it satisfies
U ′(X + e) = Q(e), (C.2)
where the function Q(e) is defined in equation (16). Note that Q is continuous, strictly decreasing
on [0, e?], and strictly increasing on [e?,∞).
Lemma C.1. If U ′(X) ≤ Q(0), then there is an equilibrium with e = 0. If U ′(X) > Q(0), then
there is an equilibrium with e > 0.
Proof. For the first part, suppose aggregate conditions are that e = 0. Then the household’s
marginal utility of consumption from simply consuming its endowment is no greater than its ex-
pected marginal cost. Households thus respond to aggregate conditions by making no purchases,
which in turn validates e = 0. For the second part, we have that minQ(e) = ν ′(`?)/F ′ (`?) > 0.
Since limc→∞ U ′(c) ≤ 0 by assumption, it follows that, for any X, there exists an e sufficiently large
that U ′(X + e) < minQ(e), and therefore there must exist a solution e > 0 to equation (C.2).
Lemma C.1 implies that an equilibrium necessarily exists. We now to showing under what condi-
tions this equilibrium is unique for all values of X. As in equation (14), let ej(e) = U
′−1(Q(e))−X
denote j’s optimal expenditure when aggregate expenditure is e, so that equilibrium is a point
ej(e) = e. ej(e) is continuous everywhere, and differentiable everywhere except at e = e
?, with
e′j(e) =
Q′(e)
U ′′ (U ′−1(Q(e)))
.
Note that e′j(e) is independent of X, strictly increasing on [0, e
?] and strictly decreasing on [e?,∞).
Lemma C.2. If
lim
e↑e?
e′j(e) < 1, (C.3)
then e′j(e) < 1 for all e.
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Proof. For e > e?, e′j(e) < 0 , so that e
′
j(e) < 1 is satisfied. For e < e
?, note that
e′′j (e) =
Q′′(e)− U ′′′ (X + ej(e))
[
e′j(e)
]2
U ′′ (X + ej(e))
.
Since Q′′(e) = 0 on this range and U ′′′ > 0, we have e′′j (e) > 0, and thus e
′
j(e) < lime↑e? e
′
j(e), which
completes the proof.
Lemma C.3. Inequality (C.3) holds if and only if
τ < τ¯ ≡ −U ′′
(
U ′−1
(
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
))
F ′ (`?) [f(`?)− Φ]
ν ′(`?)
.
Proof. We have that
lim
e↑e?
e′j(e) =
ν ′(`?)τ
−U ′′
(
U ′−1
(
ν′(`?)
F ′(`?)
))
F ′ (`?) [f(`?)− Φ]
,
which is clearly less than one if and only if τ < τ¯ .
Lemma C.4. If τ < τ¯ , then there always exists a unique equilibrium regardless of the value of X.
If τ > τ¯ , then there exists values of X ∈ R such that there are multiple equilibria.
Proof. Note that an equilibrium in (e, ej)-space is a point where the ej = ej(e) locus intersects the
ej = e locus. To see the first part of the lemma, suppose τ < τ¯ so that inequality (C.3) holds. Then
since the slope of the ej = e locus is one, and the slope of the ej = ej(e) locus is strictly less than
one by Lemma C.2, there can be only one intersection, and therefore the equilibrium is unique.
To see the second part of the lemma, suppose that τ > τ¯ and thus (C.3) does not hold. Then
by strict convexity of ej(e) on (0, e
?), there exists a value e < e? such that e′j(e) > 1 on (e, e
?).
Define X˜(e) ≡ U ′−1(Q(e)) − e, and note that e is an equilibrium when X = X˜(e). We show that
there are at least two equilibria when X = X˜(e) with e ∈ (e, e?). To see this, choose e0 ∈ (e, e?),
and note that, for X = X˜(e0), ej(e0) = e0 and e
′
j(e) > 1 on (e0, e
?). Thus, it must also be the
case that ej(e
?) > e?. But since ej(e) is continuous everywhere and strictly decreasing on e > e
?,
this implies that there exists some value e > e? such that ej(e) = e, which would represent an
equilibrium. Since e0 < e
? is also an equilibrium, there are at least two equilibria.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma C.5. If τ < τ¯ and X is such that e > 0, then de/dX < 0.
Proof. Differentiating equilibrium condition (C.2) with respect to X yields
de
dX
=
U ′′(X + e)
Q′(e)− U ′′(X + e) . (C.4)
From Lemma C.3, Q′(e) > U ′′
(
U ′−1(Q(e))
)
. In equilibrium, U ′−1(Q(e)) = X + e, so that this
inequality becomes Q′(e) > U ′′(X + e), and thus the desired conclusion follows by inspection.
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Given Lemma C.5 and the fact that the economy exhibits unemployment when e < e? and full
employment when e ≥ e?, the economy will exhibit unemployment if and only if X ≤ X?, where
X? ≡ U ′−1
(
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
)
− F ′ (`?) `?
is the level of X such that e = e? is the equilibrium. This establishes the first part of the proposition.
Next, from Lemma C.1, we see that there is a zero-employment equilibrium if and only if
U ′(X) ≤ ν′(`?)F ′(`?)(1 + τ), which holds when X ≥ X??, where
X?? ≡ U ′−1
(
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
(1 + τ)
)
.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
If X < X??, we know from Proposition 2 that e > 0, and therefore e solves equation (C.2).
Substituting e = c − X for e yields the desired result in this case. From Proposition 2, we also
know that if X ≥ X?? then e = 0, in which case c = X, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
If X > X?? then e = 0 and c = X, so that c is increasing in X. Suppose instead X < X??, so that
e > 0. Differentiating c = X + e with respect to X and using equation (C.4), we obtain
dc
dX
=
Q′(e)
Q′(e)− U ′′(X + e) . (C.5)
Since the denominator of this expression is positive (see proof of Lemma C.5), the sign of dc/dX is
given by the sign of Q′(e), which is negative if e < e? (i.e., if X? < X < X??) and positive if e > e?
(i.e., if X < X?). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 5
Letting U(e) denote welfare conditional on the coordinated level of e, we may obtain that
U(e) = U(X + e) + µ(e)
[
L? − ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
e
]
− [1− µ(e)](1 + τ) ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
e,
where µ(e) = e/[F ′ (`?) `?] denotes employment conditional on e and L? ≡ ν ′(`?)`? − ν(`?) ≥ 0.
Using the envelope theorem, the only welfare effects of a marginal change in e from its decentralized
equilibrium value are those that occur through the resulting change in employment. Thus,
U ′(e) =
[
L? + τ ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
e
]
µ′(e) > 0,
and therefore a coordinated rise in e would increase expected utility of all households.
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Proof of Proposition 6
Denote welfare as a function of X by
U(X) ≡ U(X + e) + µ [−ν(`) + V (w`− pe)] + (1− µ)V (−pe).
If X < X? (full-employment regime) or X > X?? (zero-employment regime), U ′(X) > 0 clearly
always holds. Thus, we focus on the case where X ∈ (X?, X??), in which case some algebra yields
U(X) = U(X + e) +
{
`?
[
ν ′(`?)− ν(`
?)
`?
]
+
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
τe
}
µ− ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
(1 + τ)e.
Using the envelope theorem, we may differentiate this expression with respect to X to obtain
U ′(X) = U ′(X + e) +
[
L? + ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
τe
]
dµ
dX
, (C.6)
where L? ≡ ν ′(`?)`? − ν(`?) ≥ 0.
Lemma C.6. U ′′(X) > 0 on (X?, X??).
Proof. Substituting the equilibrium condition (C.2) into (C.6) and using the fact that dµ/dX =
[F ′ (`?) `?]−1 de/dX, after some algebra we obtain
U ′(X) = ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
[
1 + τ + τµ
(
de
dX
− 1
)]
+
L?
F ′ (`?) `?
de
dX
. (C.7)
From (C.4), we may also obtain that
de
dX
=
(
ν ′(`?)τ
−U ′′(X + e) [F ′ (`?)]2 `? − 1
)−1
,
d2e
dX2
=
U ′′′(X + e)
U ′′(X + e)
de
dX
[
dc
dX
]2
> 0,
and therefore
U ′′(X) = ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
τ
dµ
dX
(
de
dX
− 1
)
+
[
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
τµ+
L?
F ′ (`?) l?
]
d2e
dX2
.
Since de/dX < 0, dµ/dx < 0 and thus the first term is positive, as is the second term, and the
proof is complete.
Lemma C.7. If τ > τ ≡ ν(`?)ν′(`?)`? τ¯1+τ¯ then there exists a range of X such that U ′(X) < 0.
Proof. Since U is convex by Lemma C.6, U ′(X) < 0 for some X if and only if limX↓X? U ′(X) <
0. Taking limits of equation (C.7), and using the facts that limX↓X? dedX = −τ¯ / (τ¯ − τ) and
limX↓X? µ = 1, we obtain that
lim
X↓X?
U ′(X) = ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
(
1− τ τ¯
τ¯ − τ
)
− L
?
F ′ (`?) `?
(
τ¯
τ¯ − τ
)
.
Substituting in from the definition of L?, straightforward algebra yields that this expression is less
than one if and only if τ > τ .
Note that, by convexity of ν(`) and the fact that ν(0) = 0, we have ν(`?) ≤ ν ′(`?)`?, and thus
τ < τ¯ , so that there always exists values of τ such that τ < τ < τ¯ . From the definition of τ , we
also see that, holding τ and ν ′(`?) constant, if ν(`?)/`? is small, this inequality is more likely to be
satisfied.
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Proof of Proposition 7
In the extended model with non-durables, the equilibrium conditions for quantities can be written40
Ud′
(
cd
)
=
ν ′
(
`d
)
F d′ (`d)
(
1 + τ − Λ min{N
d +Nn, L}
L
τ
)
, (C.8)
Λ min{Nd +Nn, L}
L
=
[
cd −X
F d′ (`d) `d
] [
Nd +Nn
Nd
]
, (C.9)
Φ =
Λ min{Nd +Nn, L}
Nd +Nn
[
F d
(
`d
)
− F d′
(
`d
)
`d
]
, (C.10)
Un′(cn) =
ν ′ (`n)
Fn′ (`n)
(
1 + τ − Λ min{N
d +Nn, L}
L
τ
)
, (C.11)
Λ min{Nd +Nn, L}
L
=
[
cn
Fn′ (`n) `n
] [
Nd +Nn
Nn
]
, (C.12)
Φ =
Λ min{Nd +Nn, L}
Nd +Nn
[
Fn (`n)− Fn′ (`n) `n] . (C.13)
We first consider equilibria within three regimes separately, then establish the relationship
between these regimes and different ranges of X. We assume that limcn→0 Un′ (cn) =∞, so that we
will always have Nn > 0. In our notation, the superscript s will index the sector, with s ∈ {d, n}.
Equilibrium Regime 1: N ≡ Nd +Nn ≥ L
Suppose N ≡ Nd +Nn ≥ L, so that µ = 1. Assuming Φ is small enough to ensure the existence of
a regime with µ < 1 (see footnote 25), we must have Nd > 0 when µ = 1. Letting ψ ≡ Nd/N , and
letting ps (`) ≡ ν ′ (`) /F s′ (`), the equilibrium conditions can be written
Ud′ (X + e) = pd
(
`d
)
, (C.14)
Un′ (cn) = pn (`n) , (C.15)
F d
(
`d
)
− F d′
(
`d
)
`d =
N
L
Φ, (C.16)
Fn (`n)− Fn′ (`n) `n = N
L
Φ, (C.17)
e = ψΩd
(
`d
)
, (C.18)
cn = (1− ψ) Ωn (`n) . (C.19)
Lemma C.8. There exists at most one equilibrium in Regime 1.
Proof. The zero-profit conditions (C.16) and (C.17) can be solved to obtain `s = `s (N), with
`s′ (N) > 0. Substituting the resource constraint equations (C.18) and (C.19) into the demand
equations (C.14) and (C.15) for e and cn, we may then reduce the system to two equations,
Ud′
(
X + ψΩd
(
`d (N)
))
= pd
(
`d (N)
)
, (C.20)
Un′ ((1− ψ) Ωn (`n (N))) = pn (`n (N)) , (C.21)
40 The prices and wages are given by wd = ν
′(`d)
v , p
d = ν
′(`d)
vFd′(`d) , w
n = ν
′(`n)
v and p
n = ν
′(`n)
vFn′(`n) .
50
in two unknowns, N and ψ. Each of these equations gives a locus of points in (N,ψ)-space, with
intersections representing equilibria. Totally differentiating with respect to N yields, respectively,
dψ
dN
=
`d′ (N)
Ωd (`d (N))
[
− p
d′ (`d (N))
−Ud′′ (X + ψΩd (`d (N))) − ψΩ
d′
(
`d (N)
)]
< 0,
dψ
dN
=
`n′ (N)
Ωn (`n (N))
[
pn′ (`n (N))
−Un′′ ((1− ψ) Ωn (`n (N))) + (1− ψ) Ω
n′ (`n (N))
]
> 0,
so that the locus associated with (C.20) is downward-sloping, and the locus associated with (C.21)
is upward-sloping. Thus, if an equilibrium exists in this region, it is clearly unique.
Lemma C.9. In an equilibrium in Regime 1, we have de/dX < 0, dcd/dX > 0 and dcn/dX > 0.
Proof. A rise in X results in a shift down of the locus associated with equation (C.20), so that
dψ/dX < 0 and dN/dX < 0. Since a fall in N results in a fall in `s and thus also ps, it follows
from equations (C.14) and (C.15) that dcd/dX > 0 and dcn/dX > 0. Further, since ψ and `d both
fall, it follows from equation (C.18) that de/dX < 0.
Equilibrium Regime 2: N < L and Nd > 0
Suppose now that N ≡ Nd +Nn < L but with a positive output of durables (Nd > 0).
Lemma C.10. For τ sufficiently small, there exists at most one equilibrium in Regime 2.
Proof. Let
Zn (e, cn) ≡ Un′−1
(
ν ′ (`n?)
Fn′ (`n?)
[
1 + τ − τ
(
e
Ωd (`d?)
+
cn
Ωn (`n?)
)])
= Un′−1
(
ν ′ (`n?)
Fn′ (`n?)
(1 + τ − τµ)
)
,
where, as before, Ωs (`) ≡ F s′ (`) `. For a given e, cn solves cn = Zn (e, cn). This solution will
always be unique if Zn2 (e, c
n) < 1 for all combinations of e and cn such that N ≤ L. Since
Zn2 (e, c
n) =
1
−U ′′ (Zn (e, cn))
ν ′ (`n?)
Fn′ (`n?)
τ
Ωn (`n?)
,
Zn2 (e, c
n) is maximized when Zn (e, cn) is maximized, which in turn occurs when µ = 1. Thus, a
sufficient condition to ensure that cn is always uniquely determined given e is that
τ < τ¯n ≡ −U ′′
(
Un′−1
(
ν ′ (`n?)
Fn′ (`n?)
))
Ωn (`n?)
Fn′ (`n?)
ν ′ (`n?)
.
Assume henceforth that this is true, and let cn (e) denote the unique value of cn that solves cn =
Zn (e, cn). Note that
cn′ (e) =
ν′(`n?)
Fn′(`n?)
τ
Ωd(`d?)
−Un′′ (cn (e))− ν′(`n?)Fn′(`n?) τΩn(`n?)
.
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Since τ < τ¯n, it may be verified that the denominator of this expression is strictly positive, so that
cn′ > 0. Further,
cn′′ (e) =
ν′(`n?)
Fn′(`n?)
τ
Ωd(`d?)
Un′′′ (cn (e)) cn′ (e)[
−Un′′ (cn (e))− ν′(`n?)Fn′(`n?) τΩn(`n?)
]2 > 0.
Next, let
Zd (e) ≡ Ud′−1
(
ν ′
(
`d?
)
F d′ (`d?)
[
1 + τ − τ
(
e
Ωd (`d?)
+
cn (e)
Ωn (`n?)
)])
= Ud′−1
(
ν ′
(
`d?
)
F d′ (`d?)
(1 + τ − τµ)
)
,
so that the equilibrium solves e = Zd (e) −X. This equilibrium is unique for all X if Zd′ (e) < 1
for all e. We have
Zd′ (e) =
1
−Ud′′ (Zd (e))
ν ′
(
`d?
)
F d′ (`d?)
τ
[
1
Ωd (`d?)
+
cn′ (e)
Ωn (`n?)
]
> 0.
Since
Zd′′ (e) =
Ud′′′
(
Zd (e)
) [
Zd′ (e)
]2
−Ud′′ (Zd (e)) +
1
−Ud′′ (Zd (e))
ν ′
(
`d?
)
F d′ (`d?)
τ
cn′′ (e)
Ωn (`n?)
> 0,
it follows that Zd′ (e) is maximized at the maximum value of e such that the economy is still in the
unemployment regime, i.e., at the value of e such that
e
Ωd (`d?)
+
cn (e)
Ωn (`n?)
= 1.
Let e? denote the value of e for which this is true, and note that
Zd (e?) ≡ Ud′−1
(
ν ′
(
`d?
)
F d′ (`d?)
)
.
Then a sufficient condition for there to always exist a unique equilibrium is that
τ < τ¯d ≡ min
{
τ¯n,−Ud′′
(
Zd (e?)
)[ 1
Ωd (`d?)
+
cn′ (e?)
Ωn (`n?)
]−1 F d′ (`d?)
ν ′ (`d?)
}
.
Lemma C.11. If τ < τ¯d, then in an equilibrium in Regime 2, we have de/dX < 0, dcd/dX < 0
and dcn/dX < 0.
Proof. Since cn′ (e) > 0, it follows that dcn/dX < 0 as long as dcd/dX < 0. Differentiating the
equilibrium condition e = Zd (e)−X with respect to X and solving yields
de
dX
= − 1
1− Zd′ (e) .
Since τ < τ¯d, we have 0 < Zd′ (e) < 1, so that de/dX < −1 and thus dcd/dX < 0.
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Equilibrium Regime 3: N ≡ Nd +Nn < L and Nd = 0
Suppose finally that there is unemployment (µ < 1), but that there is no output of durables
(Nd = 0). Clearly then, e = 0, and thus cd = X.
Lemma C.12. If τ < τ¯ , then there exists at most one equilibrium in Regime 3, and this equilibrium
is independent of X.
Proof. An equilibrium in this case is given by a solution to cn = Zn (0, cn). As argued in the proof
of Lemma C.10, this solution is unique if τ < τ¯ and given in that case by cn (0). Further, since
Zn (0, cn) does not depend on X in any way, this equilibrium is independent of X.
Equilibrium as a function of X
Define X?? ≡ Zd (0) and X? ≡ Zd (e?)− e?. It is straightforward to verify that if X < X? then the
equilibrium is in Regime 1, if X? ≤ X < X?? then the equilibrium is in Regime 2, and if X ≥ X??
then the equilibrium is in Regime 3. The properties of Proposition 7 then follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 8
Household j’s demand for new goods is given by
ej = min
{
U ′−1 (Q (e))−X, X
(1 + τ) p (e)
}
where
p (e) =

ν′(`?)
vF ′(`?) if e ≤ e?
ν′(Ω−1(e))
vF ′(Ω−1(e)) if e > e
?
Note that p (e) is constant (and equal to p?) for e < e?, while p′ (e) > 0 for e > e?. Thus,
X/ [(1 + τ) p (e)] is constant on e < e? and decreasing on e > e?.
Let X˜1 ≡ (1 + τ) p?e? and let X˜0 be the unique solution satisfying X˜ ≥ X˜1 to
U ′−1
(
Q
(
X˜
(1 + τ) p∗
))
− X˜ = X˜
(1 + τ) p?
provided such a solution exists. X˜0 is the value of X (if it exists) that places the equilibrium in
the slack region with a collateral constraint that just binds. It can be verified that the solution to
e = U ′−1 (Q (e))−X satisfies e < min {e?, X/ [(1 + τ) p?]} for X˜0 < X < X??41 when X˜0 exists, and
for X? < X < X?? when X˜0 does not exist. Thus, letting X
++ = X˜0 if X˜0 exists, and X
++ = X?
otherwise, we have that, for X++ < X < X??, the equilibrium is in the slack region and features a
non-binding collateral constraint. Part (i) of the Proposition then follows immediately.
Next, note that the equilibrium is in the slack region with a binding collateral constraint for
X < X˜0 if X˜0 exists, and for X < X˜1 if X˜0 does not exist. Thus, letting X
+ = X˜0 if X˜0 exists, and
X+ = X˜1 otherwise, we have that, for X < X
+, the equilibrium is in the slack region and features
a binding collateral constraint. Further, since e = X/ [(1 + τ) p?] in this case, we have ∂e/∂X > 0,
and thus ∂c/∂X > 1, which completes the proof of part (ii) of the Proposition.
41 Note that we must have X˜0 < X
??. Suppose not, i.e., suppose X˜0 ≥ X??. Then if X = X˜0 agents
would not want to make any purchases in equilibrium (e = 0), in which case the collateral constraint
e ≤ X/ [(1 + τ) p∗] would not bind, contradicting the definition of X˜0.
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Proof of Proposition 9
It can be verified that the steady-state level of purchases e solves
U ′
(
δ + γ
δ
e
)
= ζQ(e), (C.22)
where ζ ≡ 1−β(1−δ)1−β(1−δ)+βγ ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma C.13. For δ sufficiently small, a steady state exists and is unique.
Proof. Similar to in the static case, we may express individual j’s optimal choice of steady-state
expenditure ej given aggregate steady-state expenditure e as ej(e) =
δ
δ+γU
′−1 (ζQ(e)). As before,
we can verify that e′j(e) < 0 for e > e
?, while e′j(e) > 0 and e
′′
j (e) > 0 for e < e
?. Thus, an
equilibrium necessarily exists and is unique if e′j(e) < 1 for e < e
?, which is equivalent to the
condition that lime↑e? e′j(e) < 1. This is in turn equivalent to the condition τ < τ˜ , where
τ˜ ≡ −δ + γ
δζ
U ′′
(
U ′−1
(
ζ
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
))
F ′ (`?) [F (`?)− Φ]
ν ′(`?)
. (C.23)
As δ → 0, τ˜ approaches infinity, and thus it will hold for any τ , which completes the proof.
Note for future reference that if e′j(e) < 1 then
(δ + γ)U ′′ (X + e) < δζQ′(e). (C.24)
Lemma C.14. For δ sufficiently small, there exists a steady state in the unemployment regime.
Proof. Since U ′(0) > Q(0) by assumption, we also have U ′(0) > ζQ(0). Thus, if U ′
(
δ+γ
δ e
?
)
<
ζQ(e?) then equation (C.22) holds for at least one value of e < e?. Note that limδ→0 δ+γδ e
? =∞ and
limδ→0 ζt = (1− β)/(1− β + βγ) > 0. Thus, since limc→∞ U ′(c) ≤ 0 by assumption, it follows that
limδ→0 U ′
(
δ+γ
δ e
?
)
≤ 0 < limδ→0 ζZ (e?), and thus the desired property holds for δ close enough to
zero.
Lemmas C.13 and C.14 together prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 10
Linearizing the system in et and Xt around the steady state, letting variables with hats denote
deviations from steady state and variables without subscripts denote steady-state values, we have
X̂t+1 = (1− δ)X̂t + γêt,
êt+1 = − [1− β(1− δ)(1− δ − γ)]U
′′X + e)
β [(1− δ)Q′(e)− (1− δ − γ)U ′′(X + e)]X̂t
+
Q′(e)− [1− βγ(1− δ − γ)]U ′′(X + e)
β [(1− δ)Q′(e)− (1− δ − γ)U ′′(X + e)] êt,
or
x̂t+1 ≡
(
X̂t+1
êt+1
)
=
(
1− δ γ
aeX aee
)(
X̂t
êt
)
≡ Ax̂t,
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where aeX and aee are the coefficients on X̂t and êt in the expression for êt+1. The eigenvalues of
A are then given by
λ1 ≡ 1− δ + aee −
√
(1− δ + aee)2 − 4β−1
2
,
λ2 ≡ 1− δ + aee +
√
(1− δ + aee)2 − 4β−1
2
.
We may obtain that
λ1λ2 = β
−1 > 1, (C.25)
so that |λi| > 1 for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, this system cannot exhibit local indeterminacy
(see, e.g., Blanchard and Kahn [1980]), which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11
Note that (C.25) implies that if the eigenvalues are real then they are of the same sign, with λ2 > λ1.
Lemma C.15. The system is saddle-path stable if and only if
|1− δ + aee| > 1 + β
β
, (C.26)
in which case the eigenvalues are real and of the same sign as 1− δ + aee.
Proof. To see the “if” part, suppose (C.26) holds, and note that this implies (1 − δ + aee)2 >
[(1 + β) /β]2 > 4β−1, and therefore the eigenvalues are real. If 1 − δ + aee > (1 + β)/β, then this
implies that λ2 > λ1 > 0, and therefore the system is stable as long as λ1 < 1, which is equivalent
to the condition
(1− δ + aee)− 2 <
√
(1− δ + aee)2 − 4β−1. (C.27)
Since 1− δ+ aee > (1 +β)/β > 2, both sides of this inequality are positive, and therefore, squaring
both sides and rearranging, it is equivalent to
1− δ + aee > 1 + β
β
, (C.28)
which holds by hypothesis. A similar argument can be used to establish the claim for the case that
−(1− δ + aee) > (1 + β)/β.
To see the “only if” part, suppose the system is stable. If the eigenvalues had non-zero complex
part, then |λ1| = |λ2| > 1, in which case the system would be unstable. Thus, the eigenvalues
must be real, i.e., (1 − δ + aee)2 > 4β−1, which in turn implies that |1− δ + aee| > 2
√
β−1. If
1− δ + aee > 2
√
β−1, then, reasoning as before, λ2 > λ1 > 0, and therefore if the system is stable
then (C.27) must hold. Since (1 − δ + aee) > 2
√
β−1 > 2, then again both sides of (C.27) are
positive, and thus that inequality is equivalent to (C.28), which in turn implies (C.26). Similar
arguments establish (C.26) for the case where −(1− δ + aee) > 2
√
β−1.
Lemma C.16. The system is saddle-path stable with positive eigenvalues if and only if
(1− δ − γ)U ′′(X + e) < (1− δ)Q′(e). (C.29)
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Proof. Note that the system is stable with positive eigenvalues if and only if (C.28) holds. We have
that
1− δ + aee − 1 + β
β
=
[1− β(1− δ − γ)][δζQ′(e)− (δ + γ)U ′′(X + e)]
β[(1− δ)Q′(e)− (1− δ − γ)U ′′(X + e)] .
Since the numerator is positive by (C.24), inequality (C.28) holds if and only if (C.29) holds.
Lemma C.17. If
τ < τ˜? ≡ −1− δ − γ
1− δ U
′′
(
U ′−1
(
ζ
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
))
F ′ (`?) [F (`?)− Φ]
ν ′(`?)
,
then the system is saddle-path stable with positive eigenvalues.
Proof. Note that condition (C.29) always holds around a full-employment steady state. If the
steady state is in the unemployment regime, then condition (C.29) holds if and only if e′j(e) <
δ
δ+γ ζ
1−δ−γ
1−δ ∈ (0, 1), where ej(e) is as defined in Lemma C.13. As before, this condition holds for
all e if it holds for lime↑e? e′j(e), which it can be verified is equivalent to the condition τ < τ˜
?. Note
also that τ˜? < τ˜ , where τ˜ was defined in equation (C.23), so that this condition is strictly stronger
than the one required to ensure the existence of a unique steady state.
Lemmas C.16 and C.17 together establish that, for τ sufficiently small (e.g., τ < τ˜?), the system
converges monotonicaly to the steady state. It remains to show that consumption is decreasing
in the stock of durables. Assuming τ is sufficiently small so that the system is saddle-path stable
with positive eigenvalues, it is straightforward to obtain the solution X̂t = λ
t
1X̂0, êt = ψX̂t,
ĉt = (1 + ψ) X̂t, where ψ ≡ −(1 − δ − λ1)/γ. Thus, consumption is decreasing in the stock of
durables if and only if ψ < −1.
Lemma C.18. If (C.29) holds and the steady state is in the unemployment regime, then ψ < −1.
Proof. We may write
1− δ − γ − λ1
=
√
[aee + 2γ − (1− δ)]2 + 4β−1[β(1− δ − γ)(aee + γ)− 1]− [aee + 2γ − (1− δ)]
2
.
Now, aee + 2γ − (1 − δ) > aee − (1 − δ) > 0, so that 1 − δ − γ − λ1 is positive if and only if
β(1− δ − γ)(aee + γ) > 1. We have
β(1− δ − γ)(aee + γ) = [1 + βγ(1− δ)]Q
′(e)− U ′′(X + e)(
1−δ
1−δ−γ
)
Q′(e)− U ′′(X + e)
.
Note by earlier assumptions that this expression is strictly positive, and that
1− δ
1− δ − γ − [1 + βγ(1− δ)] = γ
1− β(1− δ)(1− δ − γ)
1− δ − γ > 0
Thus, if Q′(e) < 0 (i.e., the steady state is in the unemployment regime) then β(1−δ−γ)(aee+γ) >
1, in which case 1− δ − γ − λ1 > 0 and therefore ψ < −1.
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Proof of Proposition 12
Let e˜t (X0, ) and X˜t (X0, ) denote the paths for expenditure and the stock of durables, respec-
tively, when the initial stock of durables is X0 and there is stimulus of  in period 0. Letting
e (Xt) denote the (de-centralied) equilibrium policy function for e, we thus have X˜0 (X0, ) = X0,
e˜0 (X0, ) = e (X0) + , and, for t ≥ 1, X˜t (X0, ) = (1 − δ)X˜t−1 (X0, ) + γe˜t−1 (X0, ) and
e˜t (X0, ) = e
(
X˜t (X0, )
)
. Let U (X0, ) denote the corresponding welfare as a function of X0
and . If U (X, 0) > 0 (where X is the steady state stock of durables), then it follows that, for X0
greater than but sufficiently close to X (so that the economy is undergoing a liquidation), we will
have U (X0, 0) > 0, i.e., a small one-period stimulus will enhance welfare. We thus turn now to
establishing that U (X, 0) > 0.
Using the envelope condition, it is straightforward to obtain that
U(X, 0) =
L? + τ ν′(`?)F ′(`?)e
F ′ (`?) `?
∞∑
t=0
βt
∂e˜t (X, 0)
∂
where e is the steady state level of purchases. Thus, U(X, 0) is positive if the summation in this
expression is positive. One may obtain that
∂e˜t (X, 0)
∂
=
{
1 if t = 0,
γe′(X)
{∏t−1
i=1 [1− δ + γe′(X)]
}
if t ≥ 1,
Since e′ (X) = − (1− δ − λ1) /γ, where λ1 is the smallest eigenvalue of the dynamic system (in
modulus), we have that ∂e˜t (X, 0) /∂ = − (1− δ − λ1)λt−11 for t ≥ 1. Thus,
∞∑
t=0
βt
∂e˜t (X, 0)
∂
=
1− β (1− δ)
1− βλ1
If the system is saddle-path stable, then |λ1| < 1, and thus this expression is strictly positive, which
completes the proof.
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For online appendix
D Robustness of Results to Alternative Assumptions
In our baseline model we have made several restrictive assumptions. For example, we worked
with a matching function of the “min” form and we adopted a very particular process for the
determination of wages and hours worked. These choices have allowed us to present the main
mechanisms of interest in their simplest form. In this section we aim to highlight how our results
carry over to more general frameworks. We start by discussing how these results can be extended
to more general matching functions, then consider how the analysis changes as we adopt alternative
processes for the determination of wages and hours worked. We complete this section by making
explicit the informational constraint that limits unemployment insurance in our model. This will
allow us to use the explicit information constraint to formulate the social planner’s problem and
compare it to the market solution.42
D.1 Allowing for a More General Matching Technology
One of the important simplifying assumptions of our model is the use of a matching function of
the “min” form. This specification has the nice feature of creating two distinct regimes: one where
congestion externalities are on the worker’s side and one where they are on the firm’s side. However,
this stark dichotomy, while useful, is not central to the main results of the model. In fact, as we now
discuss, the important feature for our purposes is that there be one regime in which expenditures
by individual agents play the role of strategic substitutes and another in which they play the role
of strategic complements. To see this, it is helpful to re-examine the equilibrium condition for the
determination of expenditure for a general matching function. This is given by
U ′(X + ej) = vp(e)
[
1 + τ − M(N(e), L)
L
τ
]
≡ r(e), (D.1)
where M(N,L) is a CRS matching function satisfying M(N,L) ≤ min{N,L}. Equation (D.1)
equalizes the marginal utility of morning consumption to its cost in terms of afternoon goods.
We will refer to r(e) as the cost of funds that the households faces in the morning when taking
consumption decisions. In (D.1) we have made explicit the dependence of r on e, where this
dependence comes from viewing the other equilibrium conditions as determining N , p w and ` as
functions of e.43 Note that the other equilibrium conditions imply that p(e) and N(e) are always
weakly increasing in e. Higher morning demand e (weakly) increases the price of morning goods
and therefore the cost of funds, while also (weakly) increasing firm entry which decreases the cost
of funds, since the probability of being unemployed in the morning – and therefore of being in
42 Throughout this section we will be assuming that we are in a region of the parameter space that
guarantees uniqueness of equilibrium.
43 These remaining four equilibrium conditions can be written
ν′(`) = vw,
pF ′(`) = w,
M(N,L)F (`) = L(c−X) +NΦ,
M(N,L)[pF (`)− w`] = NpΦ.
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debt in the afternoon with a premium τ to pay – is lower. From equation (D.1), which relates the
determination of expenditure for agent j, ej , to the average expenditure of all agents, e, we see
that average expenditure can play the role of either strategic substitute or strategic complement
to the expenditure decision of agent j. In particular, through its effect on the price p, e can play
the role of a strategic substitute (if p′(e) > 0), while through its effect on firm entry and, in turn,
unemployment, it can play the role of strategic complement (if N ′(e) > 0). The sign of the net effect
of e on ej therefore depends on whether the price effect or the unemployment effect dominates.
In the case where M(N,L) = Λ min{N,L}, the equilibrium features the stark dichotomy whereby
p′(e) = 0 and ∂M(N(e), L)/∂e > 0 for e < Λe?, while p′(e) > 0 and ∂M(N(e), L)/∂e = 0 for
e > Λe?. In other words, for low values of e the expenditure of others plays the role of strategic
complement to j’s decision (since the price effect is not operative), while for high values of e it plays
the role of strategic substitute (since the increased-risk-of-unemployment channel is not operative).
This reversal in the role of e from acting as a complement to acting as a substitute can be seen in
Figure 3 as a change in the curve from being upward- to downward-sloping. These properties can
Figure D.1: Cost of Funds and Aggregate Demand
e?
r?
e?
e
Cost of
funds r(e)
Aggregate demand
U ′(X + e)
also be clearly seen in the alternative representation of the equilibrium shown in Figure D.1, where
we have plotted the cost-of-funds schedule r(e) and the marginal utility schedule U ′(X + e).44 The
important element to note in this figure is that the cost-of-funds schedule r(e) is first decreasing
and then increasing in e. Over the range e < e?, the cost of funds to an agent is declining in
aggregate e, since N is increasing while p is staying constant. Therefore, in the range e < e?,
a rise in e reduces unemployment risk and makes borrowing less costly to agents. This is the
complementarity zone. In contrast, over the range e ≥ e?, the effect of e on the cost of funds is
44 Note that the latter is always downward-sloping since U is concave.
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positive since the unemployment risk channel is no longer operative, while the price channel is.
This is the strategic substitute zone. In the figure, a change in X moves the implicit aggregate
demand curve U ′(X + e) horizontally, without affecting the cost-of-funds curve. A change in X
therefore has the equilibrium property ∂e/∂X < −1 when e < e? because the cost-of-funds curve is
downward-sloping in this region, while ∂e/∂X > −1 in the region e > e? because the cost-of-funds
curve is upward-sloping.
From the above discussion it should be clear that our main results depend on the existence of
two regions: one (associated with low levels of e) where the cost of funds is decreasing because
the negative unemployment-risk channel dominates any potentially positive price channel, and a
second (associated with high levels of e) where the price channel dominates the unemployment-risk
channel. As we now show, this characterization of the economy holds for a larger class of matching
functions, with one caveat: there may also exist an intermediate range of e with mixed properties.
The class of matching functions we consider are those that satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption D.1. The matching function M(N,L) ≤ min{N,L} is continuous, is weakly increas-
ing and concave in both arguments, exhibits constant returns to scale, and satisfies
lim
N→0
∂M
(
1, LN
)
∂N
= 0 and lim
N→∞
∂M
(
N
L , 1
)
∂L
= 0. (D.2)
While many of the properties of Assumption D.1 are fairly standard, there are two worth
emphasizing. First, a matching function clearly needs to satisfy M(N,L) ≤ min{N,L} in order
to be admissible. Note that this rules out, for example, matching functions of the Cobb-Douglas
type.45 Second, since M(1, L/N) = M(N,L)/N is the firm matching rate, ∂M(1, L/N)/∂N ≤ 0
captures the congestion effect that additional firm entry has on that matching rate. The first
part of equation (D.2) requires that this firm congestion effect disappears as N becomes small.
Similarly, ∂M(N/L, 1)/∂L ≤ 0 denotes the worker congestion effect, so that the second part of
equation (D.2) requires that worker congestion disappears as N becomes large. Simple examples
of matching functions that satisfy Assumption D.1 include the “min” function used above and the
ball-urn matching function given by M(N,L) = N(1− exp{−L/N}).46
In order to characterize equilibrium outcomes for the class of matching functions satisfying
Assumption D.1, it is useful to first define the cut-off level of X, denoted Xmax, that would just
cause trade in the economy to fall zero. This value is defined by Xmax = U ′−1( ν
′(`?)
F ′(`?))(1 + τ), where
`? is defined implicitly by [F (`?)− F ′(`?)`?]M1(0, L) = Φ. We can now examine how the economy
behaves with low versus high values of X for a more general specification of the matching function.
This is given by Proposition D.1.
Proposition D.1. For any matching function satisfying Assumption D.1,47 if F (`) = A`α then
there exist X+ and X++ satisfying X+ ≤ X++ < Xmax, such that equilibrium outcomes are
characterized by
(i) If X < X+, then there is not deficient demand and ∂c∂X ≥ 0.
(ii) If X ∈ (X++, Xmax), then there is deficient demand and ∂c∂X < 0.
45 More generally, this rules out any matching function of the CES form with elasticity of substitution
greater than or equal to one.
46 See, for example, Hall [1979] for the use of the ball-urn matching function, and Pissarides and Petrongolo
[2001] for a more general discussion of matching functions.
47 We are again assuming that τ is suffciently small to guarantee a unique equilibrium
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See Section D.6 for proofs of all Appendix D propositions.
Proposition D.1 generalizes results of Section 3 by indicating that, for our class of matching
functions, the behavior of our model economy will again differ depending on whether the economy
inherits a small or a large amount of goods from the past.48 In particular, the proposition states
that, for large values of X, the economy will again exhibit deficient demand – in the sense that
agents’ purchases are strategic complements, and a coordinated increase in c would increase welfare
– and that in such a region the economy acts rather perversely with ∂c∂X < 0. In contrast, the
economy would not exhibit deficient demand or act perversely if X were small.
The main difference between Proposition D.1 and the results of Section 3 is that, with the
“min” matching function, two regions spanned all possible values of X < Xmax. However, this is
not the case with Proposition D.1. Implicit in Proposition D.1 is the possible existence of a third
region between X+ and X++ where properties may be mixed. We have not been able to exclude
the possibility of such a third region for this general class of matching functions. However, for
most parametric examples, we have been able to find simple sufficient conditions that guarantee
the simple dichotomy, so that this third potential region is in fact empty (or, in other words, that
X+ = X++). For example, if we assume that disutility of labor ν is of the constant-elasticity form
ν(`) = `1+ω and that the matching function is of the ball-urn type, then the third region is empty.
A second interesting example is the case where the matching function is CES with elasticity of
substitution strictly less than one, i.e., where M(N,L) = (N−γ +L−γ)−
1
γ with γ > 0.49 If γ > 1, it
can be verified that this matching function satisfies Assumption D.1, and further that our simple
dichotomy (where X+ = X++) also holds.50 Although the ball-urn and CES matching functions
are special parametric cases, these examples nicely illustrate that many of the results obtained
using the simpler “min” matching function are not knife-edge, as they carry over to these alternate
cases.51
D.2 Generalizing the V (·) Function
In deriving our previous results we assumed that the function V (a), which represents the contin-
uation value of entering the afternoon market with assets a, took the form of a piecewise-linear
function with a kink at zero. This allowed V (a) to possess the property that V ′ (a1) > V ′ (a2) for
a1 < 0 < a2 – which is of fundamental importance in generating the precautionary behavior that
is central to the main mechanism – while maintaining analytical tractability. In this section we
discuss how our result regarding the effect of X on c generalizes when we assume simply that V (a)
is increasing and concave in a, without restricting it to be piecewise linear. It can be again shown
in this case that there exist a X? and and X?? such that if X? < X < X?? then the labor market
48 The restriction in Proposition D.1 that F (`) = A`α is not necessary for the result, but it greatly
simplifies presentation.
49 This matching function was used in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson [2000].
50 This result is based on maintaining the functional form assumption ν(`) = `1+ω.
51 The ball-urn function and CES function with γ > 1 belong to a more general class of matching functions
for which we may obtain a simple sufficient condition to ensure the simple dichotomy when ν(`) = `1+ω.
In particular, let η(N,L) ≡ N/M(N,L) be the inverse of the firm matching rate, and suppose η is convex
in N (as is the case for the above functions). Then it may be verified that a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition for Proposition D.1 to hold with X+ = X++ is that α ≥ (1 + ω)/2.
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is slack. The equilibrium condition determining e = c−X in this range can be written as
U ′ (X + e) =
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
µ(e) + [1− µ(e)] V
′
(
− w(e)F ′(`?)e
)
V ′
(
w(e)`? − w(e)F ′(`?)e
)
 (D.3)
where `? continues to be defined by the condition F (`?) − F ′ (`?) `? = Φ, µ(e) = e/ [F ′ (`?) `?] is
the employment rate, and the function w(e) is implicitly defined by the condition
ν ′(`?) = w(e)V ′
(
w(e)`? − w(e)
F ′ (`?)
e
)
. (D.4)
Our previous formulation had a very similar form to equation (D.3) except that the term
V ′
(
− w(e)F ′(`?)e
)
V ′
(
w(e)`? − w(e)F ′(`?)e
) ≡ 1 + τ(e)
was constant and equal to 1 + τ . Hence, the implication of adopting a piecewise-linear function
was to allow us to treat τ(e) as a constant. In the more general case, we need to take into account
how τ(e) changes with e.
As we noted in the previous section, the right-hand side of equation (D.3) can be interpreted
as the marginal cost of funds to the household and can again be represented by a function r(e).
The necessary condition for an increase in X to lead to a fall in c is that r′(e) < 0. We can see
that e will now affect r(e) through two channels. As in the piecewise-linear case, there is the effect
operating through µ(e), which is always negative. In addition, there is the effect operating through
the function τ(e). The combined effect will be negative as long as τ ′(e) is not too positive. It is
important to recognize that the effect of e on τ(e) is quite involved, since when V (a) is not piecewise
linear, changes in e will affect wages, which in turn affect τ(e). Sufficient conditions for τ ′(e) to be
negative are given in the following proposition.
Proposition D.2. The function τ(e) =
V ′
(
− w(e)
F ′(`?) e
)
V ′
(
w(e)`j− w(e)F ′(`?) e
) − 1 will be decreasing in e if (1) the
elasticity of V ′(a) is greater than -1 when a > 0, and (2) V ′′′(a) is not too positive.52
Proposition D.2 implies that our result regarding the negative effect of X on c is robust to
allowing for a more general V (·) function. While the result does not generalize to any function
V (a) that is increasing and concave in a, Proposition D.2 indicates that the curvature of V (a) must
change sufficiently with changes in a for the result to be potentially reversed. Let us also emphasize
that Proposition D.2 provides sufficient conditions for a change in e to decrease the marginal cost
of fund (r(e)); these conditions are not in general necessary.53
52 These conditions can be translated into conditions on the functions U˜ and ν˜. For example, the required
properties on V (a) will be met if the elasticity of ν˜ is smaller than one and if neither ν˜′′′ nor U˜ ′′′ are too
positive.
53 If the function V (a) satisfy the conditions of Proposition D.2, it implies that ∂c/∂X cannot be between
0 and 1. However, it does not rule out the possibility of the perverse case where ∂c/∂X is greater than 1.
Since the case where ∂c/∂X generally implies multiple equilibria, and we are not interested in cases with
multiple equilibria, we do not explore this possibility further here.
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D.3 Allowing X to Enter V (·)
Up to now, we have assumed that a household’s stock of durables X cannot be used to help repay
one’s debt in the afternoon period. In this section, we briefly discuss how allowing X to enter V ()˙
could change the results. For example, suppose the continuation value of entering the afternoon
period with assets a is given by a function of the form V (a,X) with Va > 0, Vaa < 0, VX > 0 and,
most importantly, VaX < 0; that is, having more X would reduce the costs associated with taking
on more debt. There are two cases to consider here depending on the partial-equilibrium effect
of X on demand for new purchases. First, consider the case where VaX is such that the partial-
equilibrium response of a household (holding µ, p, and w fixed) to an increase in X continues to be
a decrease in purchases. In this case, our analysis is not much changed, since the first-round effect
is a decrease in e, and then as long as the conditions expressed just above for the more general V (·)
function hold, then the multiplier process with take effect and the net general-equilibrium effect
can still lead to a decrease in consumption. However, if VaX is sufficiently negative for the partial
equilibrium effect of X on e to be positive,54 then the multiplier effect will be set in motion, but
in this case the net general-equilibrium effect will be an increase in c. Hence, if VaX is allowed to
be sufficiently negative, the main results can be reversed.
D.4 Changing the Search and Bargaining Protocol
In this section, we return to the “min” specification of the matching function and examine how
results are modified when we maintain random matching but change the bargaining protocol to Nash
bargaining. We then discuss the implications of adopting directed search. In the remaining sections
of the paper, we will simplify notation by setting Λ = 1 and thereby have M(N,L) = min{N,L}.
This implies that a tight labor market will be characterized by full employment and a slack labor
market with be characterized by unemployment. As should be clear from our previous analysis, the
important distinction between the two regimes is not that the presence or absence of unemployment,
but is instead the fact that in a slack labor market (N < L) workers experience cogestion effects
while in a tight labor market (N > L) it is the firms that experience congestion effects.
D.4.1 Nash Bargaining
In our baseline model we assumed that, upon a successful search, wages and employment were
determined by a Walrasian protocol in the spirit of that used by Lucas and Prescott [1974]. This
protocol gave rise to two results. First, it implied that hours worked satisfies a pair-wise efficient
condition given by
pF ′(`) =
ν ′(`)
v
,
and second it implied that the wage is equal to the marginal dis-utility of work;55 that is,
w =
ν ′(`)
v
.
Suppose we replace this “competitive” determination of w and ` (within a match) by Nash bar-
gaining.
54 This arises when the effect of the decreased marginal cost of debt from having more X dominates its
effect on the marginal utility, U ′.
55 We could alternatively say here that wages are given by the marginal product condition w = pF ′(`).
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The gain from a match for a firm is pF (`)− w` while outside option is zero. The gain for the
household is −ν(`)+V (w`−p(c−X) while the outside option is V (−p(c−X)). Using the piecewise
linear specification for V , the Nash-Bargaining criterion W is:
W =
(
pF (`)− w`
)1−s(
− ν(`) + vw`+ vτp(c−X)
)s
.
Maximizing W w.r.t. ` and w gives the following F.O.C.:
(1− s)W
pF (`)− w`
(
pF ′(`)− w
)
=
sW
−ν(`) + vw`+ vτp(c−X)
(
vw − ν ′(`)
)
,
(1− s)W
pF (`)− w` =
sW
−ν(`) + vw`+ vτp(c−X)v.
Rearranging gives the two equations
vpF ′(`) = ν ′(`),
vw` = svpF (`) + (1− s)ν(`)− (1− s)vτp(c−X).
Thus, an equilibrium is given by a solution to the five equations:
u′(c) =
ν ′(`)
F ′(`)
(
1 + τ − M(N,L)
L
τ
)
, (D.5)
w` = spF (`) +
1− s
v
ν(`)− (1− s)τp(c−X), (D.6)
vpF ′(`) = ν ′(`), (D.7)
M(N,L)F (`) = L(c−X) +NΦ, (D.8)
M(N,L)
(
pF (`)− w`) = pNΦ. (D.9)
As shown above, under Nash bargaining the within-pair efficiency condition pF ′(`) = ν ′(`)/v
remains. However, the determination of wages changes. In particular, under Nash bargaining the
wage is given by (D.6), that we can rewrite as
w =
ν(`)− τp(c−X) + s [pF (`)− ν(`) + τp(c−X)]
l
, 0 ≤ s < 0, (D.10)
where s reflects the share of the match surplus that is attributed to the worker (an additional
parameter). The total wage payment now reflects the reservation utility of the worker, which is
given by ν(`)−τp(c−X), plus a share of the match surplus, which is given by pF (`)−ν(`)+τp(c−X).
An important implication of this is that the wage is now decreasing in c. If a worker enters a match
with a greater c, he is in a less desirable bargaining position since, if negotiations were to break
down, the worker would be left with costly debt. This causes the worker to settle for a lower wage
when he has committed to a high level of consumption. Our baseline formulation ruled out this
mechanism in the determination of wages. As we shall now show, this mechanism will tend to
amplify a number of our of previous results, since it will imply that p will be a decreasing function
of c, which will in turn cause the cost-of-funds schedule (plotted in Figure D.1) to have an even
more negative slope in the unemployment regime.
With Nash bargaining, the equilibrium determination of c, N and ` reduces to the solution to
equations (11), (9), and the zero-profit condition given (D.9) that we can rewrite
(1− s)min{N,L}
N
[
F (`)− ν(`)F
′(`)
ν ′(`)
+ τ(c−X)
]
= Φ, (D.11)
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where we have used the new wage equation (D.10).56 Proposition D.3 states that under Nash
Bargaining we get a similar characterization of equilibrium outcomes as that obtained in our baseline
model.57
Proposition D.3. When wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining, there again
exists an X? and an X?? > X? such that
(i) If X < X?, then the labor market will be tight (N > L), there is not deficient demand, and
∂c
∂X ≥ 0.
(ii) If X ∈ (X?, X??), then the labor market will be slack (N ≤ L), there is deficient demand,
and ∂c∂X < 0.
(iii) If X ≥ X??, then c = X.
Although Proposition D.3 indicates that many equilibrium properties remain unchanged as we
switch from our baseline bargaining protocol to Nash bargaining, this does not imply that the
equilibrium values of c and ` do not change. For example, in the slack regime of our baseline
model, the equilibrium had a recursive structure. The zero-profit condition determined `, and
hence the price p, and then the optimal consumption decision was determined by the condition
U ′(c) = ν
′(`)
F ′(`) [1 + τ − τ c−XF (`)−Φ ]. Accordingly, in our baseline setup, the price of goods and hours
worked did not vary as we changed X when the labor market was slack. In the case of Nash
bargaining this recursive property is lost. The optimal consumption decision and the zero-profit
condition must be solved jointly for ` and c, which in turn implies that the price also changes as
X changes. These effects are characterized in Proposition D.4.
Proposition D.4. If wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining, then
(i) When the labor market is tight (i.e., for X < X?), ∂p∂X < 0 and
∂`
∂X < 0.
(ii) When the labor market is slack (i.e., for X ∈ (X?, X??)), ∂p∂X > 0 and ∂`∂X > 0.
Propositions D.3 and D.4 together indicate that, when the labor market is slack, an increase in
X will lead to lower consumption and higher prices. The reason for this is that, as one cuts back
on consumption due to higher X, the worker’s bargaining position improves, which puts downward
pressure on firm profits. In order to maintain zero expected profits, matched firms must then hire
more hours of labor, which in turn results in higher prices. This contrasts with our baseline model
where an increase in X in a slack market led to lower consumption at an unchanged price. The
extra mechanism induced by Nash bargaining can therefore be seen as increasing the strength of
the complementarity between the consumption decisions of the households in comparison to our
baseline setup. Note that, in the slack regime, the consumption decision for household j satisfies
the relationship U ′(cj) = p[1 + τ − τ c−XF (`)−Φ ], where c is the average consumption level of other
agents. Recall that this condition holds regardless of whether we have Nash bargaining or the
Walrasian protocol of our baseline model. In the slack regime of our baseline model, an exogenous
56 We will assume that the function sF (`) + (1 − s)ν(`)F ′(`)ν′(`) is always increasing in `, as can be easily
verified to be the case under standard functional forms.
57 We have also derived sufficient conditions for an increase in X to lead to a decrease in welfare in the
presence of Nash Bargaining. However, the expressions are rather complicated and not very informative, so
we have omitted them here. Using numerical simulations, we have found it rather easy to find regions in the
unemployment regime where an increase in X leads to a decrease in welfare.
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increase in c would not change p or `, so from the household’s optimal consumption decision we can
see easily that the consumption of other agents acts as a complement to one’s own consumption.
In the case of Nash bargaining, this complementarity becomes even stronger, as in addition to the
direct effects of others’ consumption on the probability of employment, when the consumption of
other agents increases that tends to decrease the price and lower hours worked, and hence further
increases one’s desire to consume. Since this additional mechanism is rather subtle, we opted to
focus on the simpler and more direct mechanism in the baseline model, leaving us to clarify this
additional channel here.
To conclude this section, we present in Figure D.2 the behavior of consumption and welfare as
a function of X for an example with Nash bargaining. The parameters used in this example are
similar to those used in in Figures 2 and ?? for our baseline model. As can be seen, consumption and
welfare are both increasing until X reaches X?, after which they begin to decline as the economy
enters a region where the labor market is slack.
Figure D.2: Consumption and Welfare as Functions of X (Nash Bargaining)
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D.4.2 Directed Search
Up to now, we have focused on environments where search is done in a random fashion. In this
section, we explore how our results would change if we allowed for directed search.58 In particular,
we examine whether the emergence of deficient demand when X is high and the property that
∂c
∂X < 0 in such cases are driven by the assumption of random search, or whether they are robust
to allowing for directed search.
In the case of directed search, we can view the household’s problem as simultaneously choosing
both a consumption level and a particular labor market in which to search for a job. There is a
58 Directed search is also known as competitive search; see Moen [1997].
66
potential continuum of job markets, each specified as a triple composed of a wage, a number of
hours worked, and a tightness level, where tightness level θ ≡ N/L translates into a job-finding rate
for workers of M(θ, 1). The potential job markets available to households in equilibrium are all of
the triples of characteristics w, ` and θ that leave firms with zero profits. The equilibrium outcome
for this economy therefore maximizes household utility subject to the firm’s zero-profit condition
(taking the price p as given); that is, it solves
max
c,w,`,θ
U(c) +M(θ, 1) [−ν(`) + V (w`− p(c−X))] + [1−M(θ, 1)]V (−p(c−X))
subject to
M
(
1, θ−1
) [
F (`)− w
p
`
]
= Φ.
Maintaining the usual assumption on the form of V (·), solving this maximization problem yields
the now-familiar conditions U ′(c) = pv(1+τ−M(N,L)L τ), pF ′(`) = ν
′(`)
v , and
M(N,L)
N [F (`)− wp `] = Φ.
The only new condition is the wage-determination equation, which is now given by
w =
ν(`)− τp(c−X) + ξ [pF (`)− ν(`) + τp(c−X)]
`
, (D.12)
where ξ is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to L, as given by ξ = M2(N,L)LM(N,L) . The
set of equilibrium conditions is then completed with the usual market-clearing condition for the
goods market, M(N,L)F (`) = L(c−X) +NΦ.
If we combine the wage determination equation (D.12) with the zero-profit condition, we get
(1− ξ)M(N,L)
N
[
F (`)− ν(`)F
′(`)
ν ′(`)
+ τ(c−X)
]
= Φ. (D.13)
This zero-profit condition is identical to the one obtained under Nash bargaining (equation (D.11)),
except the fixed bargaining power s from the Nash bargaining setup has been replaced by the (en-
dogenous) elasticity of the matching function ξ, which is a standard result in the case of directed
search. If we assume that the matching function is once again of the “min” form, we can de-
rive similar results to those obtained for the random-search Nash bargaining case, as stated in
Proposition D.5.
Proposition D.5. The properties stated in Proposition D.3 also hold under directed search.
Proposition D.5 indicates that, under directed search, the economy will again have a tendency
to exhibit deficient demand and behave perversely when X is high, while this will not be the case
if X is low.
D.5 Justifying the Absence of Unemployment Insurance and For-
mulating the Social Planner’s Problem
In our analysis thus far, we have assumed that agents do not have access to unemployment insur-
ance. It may be thought that allowing for the private provision of unemployment insurance would
necessarily eliminate the mechanisms we have highlighted. For this reason, in this subsection we
want to indicate how our analysis can be extended to allow for the private provision of unem-
ployment insurance, but where the provision of this insurance will be constrained by an adverse
selection problem. Once we have presented this adverse selection problem, we can then examine the
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more interesting question of how a social planner would allocate resources in an economy subject to
two frictions: a search friction that creates unemployment, and an information friction that limits
unemployment insurance. The solution to this social planner’s problem will then be used to clarify
the fundamental nature of the inefficiency that arises in the de-centralized case.
D.5.1 Adverse Selection as a Constraint on Unemployment Insurance
To explore the role of adverse selection, we return to our baseline model of Section 3, but now
suppose that only a fraction ρ of households behave as the households we modeled in that Section.
We will refer to these households as participant households. Suppose the remaining (1−ρ) fraction
of households, which we call the non-participant households, do not value consumption in the
morning and are unwilling to work at the market wage, but value consumption in the afternoon
in exactly the same way as the participant households. Now suppose that some private insurer
wanted to offer unemployment insurance before the matching process, but could not differentiate
between the two types of households. In this case, the insurer will not be able to offer insurance
contracts that are only attractive to participant households, because any contract with a positive net
payment to unemployed individuals will be desirable to non-participants. Therefore, as indicated
in Proposition D.6, as long as 1 − ρ is sufficiently high this type of adverse selection problem
implies that the only equilibrium outcome is one where no insurance is offered. Accordingly, in this
setup, the mechanisms we have emphasized regarding the economy’s behavior when unemployment
insurance is assumed not to exist will apply equally in an environment where the private provision
of unemployment insurance is allowed but is constrained by an adverse selection problem.
Proposition D.6. In the presence of both participant households and non-participant households,
if 1 − ρ ≥ 11+τ , i.e., if the fraction of non-participant households is sufficiently high, then no
unemployment-insurance contracts are traded in equilibrium.
D.5.2 The Constrained Social Planner’s Problem
In this section we want to show how a social planner would allocate resources in our environment if
it simultaneously faces the search friction and the adverse selection problem presented previously.
We will take the goal of the social planner to be the maximization of utility of participant households
subject to the constraint that it offers contracts to participant households that are not attractive to
non-participant households. We implicitly assume here that the social planner cannot distinguish
between the two types of agents, and that non-participant households are sufficiently important in
number that it is not socially optimal to include them in any transfer scheme where they would be
pure beneficiaries. We view the planner as offering a contract specifying four elements: an amount
of the morning good e that is not contingent on morning labor market status; a number of hours
worked conditional on finding employment, `; an amount of the afternoon good to receive if one is
employed in the morning, de; and an amount of the afternoon good that must be produced if one is
unemployed in the morning, du. In the absence of the adverse selection problem, the social planner
problem would choose these elements, plus the number of firms to enter the market, by solving
max
c,l,N,de,du
U(X + e) +
M(N,L)
L
[vde − ν(`)]−
[
1− M(N,L)
L
]
v(1 + τ)du,
subject to the resource constraint in the morning M(N,L)F (`) = Le + NK and the resource
constraint in the afternoon M(N,L)L d
e = [1− M(N,L)L ]du. It is easy to verify that the solution to this
problem has de = du; that is, household would not bear any risk associated with unemployment.
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The problem with this solution is that a non-participant household would in general want to
participate in this scheme by accepting the offered morning goods, and then trading these goods
to participant households in return for promises of afternoon goods. In fact, a non-participant
households will want to take part in any scheme offered by the planner if it can manage to end up
with a positive amount of afternoon goods (after deducting du, the number of goods transferred
to the planner) by making such trades. Recognizing this, the social planner will be constrained
to choose values of e and du that will be unattractive to non-participant households.59 For this
to be the case, it must be that a non-participant household cannot, by trading away all e of their
morning good, obtain enough afternoon goods so that they are left with a positive amount after
paying the required du to the planner. It can be verified that the relevant incentive compatibility
constraint is given by60
U ′(x+ e)
1 + τ − M(N,L)L τ
e ≤ du. (D.14)
On the left-hand side of this constraint is the number of afternoon goods that a non-participant
could obtain by selling all of their morning goods. Here, U
′(x+e)
1+τ−M(N,L)
L
τ
is the expected marginal value
to participant households of morning goods, expressed in terms of afternoon goods. Accordingly,
a non-participant household would accept any contract offered by the planner that satisfies du <
eU ′(x+e)
1+τ−M(N,L)
L
τ
, since that household could guarantee itself a positive amount of afternoon goods after
repaying the amount du agreed upon in the contract.
Once the constraint (D.14) is taken into account, the solution to the social planner’s problem
is given by the two resource constraints, the incentive compatibility condition at equality (since it
always binds), plus the two new conditions
U ′(X + e) =
ν ′(`)
F ′(`)
· 1 + τ −
M(N,L)
L τ
1 +
[
1− M(N,L)L
] −U ′′(X+e)
U ′(X+e) eτ
, (D.15)
(1− ξ) M (N,L)
N
F (`)− ν (`)F ′ (`)ν ′ (`) + τe{1 + [1− M(N,L)L ] −U ′′(X+e)U ′(X+e) eτ}
 =
Φ + (1− ξ) M (N,L)
N
τ2e
[
1− M(N,L)L
]
1 + τ
[
1− M(N,L)L
] · 1
1 +
[
1− M(N,L)L
] −U ′′(X+e)
U ′(X+e) eτ
, (D.16)
where, as before, ξ is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to L. Equation (D.15)
can be interpreted as the socially optimal condition for the determination of expenditures, while
equation (D.16) can be interpreted as the socially optimal zero-profit condition. It is interesting to
compare these two conditions to those we derived for a decentralized economy. One can see that, for
all cases we considered, the decentralized conditions determining expenditures and entry decisions
differ from the solution to the planner’s problem as long as τ > 0. The environment that most
59 Since they never search for jobs, non-participant households do not care about the levels of ` or de
specified in the contract.
60 We assume that any trade between households occurs before the resolution of unemployment uncertainty
in the morning. Further, we assume that the realized employment state of one household cannot be verified
by another, so that any promise of afternoon goods made by a household in the morning cannot be contingent
on the realized state of their employment.
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closely resembles the social planner’s solution is the decentralized economy with directed search.
Accordingly, we will focus our comparison here between directed search and the social optimum,
noting that much of what we say also extends to our baseline analysis and to the case with Nash
bargaining.
In comparison to the solution under directed search, the social planner would want to encourage
more expenditure by households in the morning while simultaneously limiting firm entry. This can
be seen by the fact that the term in the denominator on the right-hand side of equation (D.15)
is greater that one, and by the fact that the last term in equation (D.16) is positive. The social
planner could implement his preferred outcome in a directed-search environment by the use of a
subsidy on the purchase of morning goods,61 and by a tax on entry.62 If we go a step further and
focus on the case where the matching function is of the “min” form, then we can see that the social
planner’s solution and the decentralized solution with directed search actually become identical
in the case of a tight labor market.63 However, they continue to differ when the labor market is
slack, which will happen for high values of X. This comparison highlights that economic activity
will be inefficiently low in the directed search environment when X is high, but not when it is low.
In other words, if the value of trading in the market is high, as is the case when X is low, the
decentralized economy can overcome the frictions and trade at the socially efficient level. However,
when the gains from trade between individuals are rather low, as is the case when X is high, the
decentralized outcome under directed search will be inefficient relative to the constrained social
optimum.
The reason that the social planner’s problem and the directed-search equilibrium do not co-
incide is due to a pecuniary externality. When agents are deciding how much to consume in the
decentralized environment, they do not take into account the effect of their consumption on em-
ployment and prices. They do not recognize that, by consuming more, they would reduce wage
demands, thereby favoring lower prices and more production. Since the extra production is socially
desirable, as the economy tends to be in a situation of deficient demand with high X, it would be
in the interest of agents to coordinate action by consuming more and favoring more entry.
D.6 Proofs of Appendix D Propositions
Proof of Proposition D.1
Let θ ≡ N/L be labor-market tightness and µ (θ) ≡ M (θ, 1) be the resulting employment rate.
Then we can obtain
` = ` (θ) ≡
[
Φθ
(1− α)Aµ (θ)
] 1
α
,
e =
αΦ
(1− α)θ,
p = p (θ) ≡ ν
′ (` (θ))
αA [` (θ)]α−1
,
w = w (θ) ≡ ν ′ (` (θ)) .
61 In order to implement the social optimum, the subsidy would need to depend on the value of X.
62 The budget can be balanced by imposing a lump-sum tax on the employed as needed.
63 With the matching function of the “min” form, the free entry condition implies that N = L.
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Equilibrium is then given by a solution to the equation
U ′
(
X +
αΦ
(1− α)θ
)
= Q (θ) ≡ p (θ) [1 + τ − τµ (θ)]
for θ.
Lemma D.1. For X sufficiently small, dc/dX ≥ 0. For X < Xmax sufficiently large, dc/dX < 0.
Proof. Assuming τ is small enough so that the equilibrium is unique, it can be easily verified that
dc/dX < 0 if Q′ (θ) < 0 and dc/dX > 0 if Q′ (θ) > 0. Further, since dθ/dX < 0, showing that
Lemma D.1 holds is equivalent to showing that Q′ (θ) < 0 for θ sufficiently small (i.e., X sufficiently
large) and Q′ (θ) > 0 for θ sufficiently large (i.e., X sufficiently small).
We have
Q′ (θ) = p (θ)
{
p′ (θ)
p (θ)
[1 + τ − τµ (θ)]− τµ′ (θ)
}
.
We may obtain that
p′ (θ)
p (θ)
= [ω (θ) + 1− α] `
′ (θ)
` (θ)
,
where
ω (θ) ≡ ν
′′ (` (θ)) ` (θ)
ν ′ (` (θ))
≥ 0,
and
`′ (θ)
` (θ)
=
1− Eµθ (θ)
αθ
,
where the notation Efx (x) denotes the elasticity f ′ (x)x/f (x). Thus
Q′ (θ) =
p (θ)
θ
Γ (θ) , (D.17)
where
Γ (θ) ≡ ω (θ) + 1− α
α
[1− Eµθ (θ)] [1 + τ − τµ (θ)]− τµ′ (θ) θ.
Consider first the case where θ → ∞. From (D.17), we see that the sign of Q′ (θ) is equal to
the sign of Γ (θ). Since, by Assumption D.1,
lim
N→∞
∂M
(
N
L , 1
)
∂L
= 0,
we may obtain that
lim
θ→∞
µ′ (θ) θ = 0,
which in turn implies that limθ→∞ Eµθ (θ) = 0. Thus, letting µ¯ ≡ limθ→∞ µ (θ), we have
lim
θ→∞
Γ (θ) = (1 + τ − τ µ¯) lim
θ→∞
ω (θ) + 1− α
α
> 0,
so that for θ sufficiently large (X sufficiently small) we have Q′(θ) > 0, and thus dc/dX > 0.
Next, consider the case where θ → 0. From (D.17), we see that the sign of Q′ (θ) is equal to
the sign of Γ(θ)/θ, so that sgn(Q′(0)) = sgn(limθ→0 Γ(θ)/θ). We have
lim
θ→0
Γ (θ)
θ
=
ω (0) + 1− α
α
(1 + τ) lim
θ→0
[
1− Eµθ (θ)
θ
]
− τµ′ (0) .
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Note that the basic restrictions on the matching function imply that µ (0) = 0 and 0 < µ′ (0) ≤ 1.64
Thus,
lim
θ→0
Eµθ (θ) = lim
θ→0
µ′ (θ)
µ (θ) /θ
.
Since the limit of the numerator is non-zero and bounded, and the limit of the denominator
is equal to µ′ (0) by definition (since µ (0) = 0), which is also non-zero and bounded, we have
limθ→0 Eµθ (θ) = 1. By Assumption D.1,
lim
N→0
∂M
(
1, LN
)
∂N
= 0,
from which we may obtain
0 = − 1
L
lim
θ→0
µ (θ)
θ
1− Eµθ (θ)
θ
= −µ
′ (0)
L
lim
θ→0
1− Eµθ (θ)
θ
.
Since µ′ (0) > 0, this can only be true if limθ→0 [1− Eµθ (θ)] /θ = 0. Thus,
lim
θ→0
Γ (θ)
θ
= −τµ′ (0) < 0,
so that for θ sufficiently small (X sufficiently large) Q′(θ) < 0, and thus dc/dX < 0, which completes
the proof.
Lemma D.2. For X sufficiently small, there is not deficient demand. For X < Xmax sufficiently
large, there is deficient demand.
Proof. Conditional on θ, equilibrium welfare is given by
U (X, θ) ≡ U
(
X +
αΦ
(1− α)θ
)
+ µ (θ) [w (θ) ` (θ)− ν (` (θ))]−Q (θ) αΦ
(1− α)θ.
Using the envelope theorem and other results from above, at the equilibrium level of θ we may
obtain that
U2 (X, θ) = µ′ (θ)
[
ν ′ (`) `− ν (`)]+ µ (θ) ν ′′ (`) `2
αθ
[1− Eµθ (θ)]−Q′ (θ) αΦ
(1− α)θ.
If Q′ (θ) < 0, which occurs when X is sufficiently large (see Lemma D.1), then clearly U2 (X, θ) > 0,
so that we have deficient demand. Suppose instead that Q′ (θ) > 0, which occurs when X is
sufficiently small. Substituting in for Q′ (θ) we may obtain
U2 (X, θ) = µ (θ)
θ
ν ′ (`) `
{
Eµθ (θ)
[
1 + τµ (θ)− ν (`)
ν ′ (`) `
]
− [1− Eµθ (θ)]
[
ω (θ) + 1− α
α
τ (1− µ (θ)) + 1− α
α
]}
.
64 Technically, Asssumption D.1 does not rule out the possibility that µ′ (0) = 0. However, since µ is
concave and non-decreasing, if µ′ (0) = 0 this would imply that µ (θ) = 0 for all θ, i.e., employment is always
zero. We ignore this uninteresting case.
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Since ν (`) /ν ′ (`) ` ≤ 1 and Eµθ (θ) → 0 as θ → ∞, the first term in braces approaches zero as
θ →∞, while the second term approaches
− 1
α
{
τ lim
θ→∞
ω (θ) [1− µ (θ)] + 1− α
}
< 0,
so that for θ sufficiently large (X sufficiently small) U2 (X, θ) ≤ 0, so that there is not deficient
demand.
Proof of Proposition D.2
We may write the right-hand side of (D.3) as
r (e, w, µ) =
ν ′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
µ+ (1− µ) V ′
(
− wF ′(`?)e
)
V ′
(
w`? − wF ′(`?)e
)
 .
There are thus three effects of e on r: the direct effect, the effect through w, and the effect through
µ. As noted in the text, the effect through µ is always negative. Next, we have that
rw = − ν
′(`?)
F ′ (`?)
`?
µV ′′
(
− wF ′(`?)e
)
+ (1− µ) V
′
(
− w
F ′(`?) e
)
V ′
(
w`?− w
F ′(`?) e
)V ′′ (w`? − wF ′(`?)e)
V ′
(
w`? − wF ′(`?)e
) > 0,
by concavity of V , so that the effect of e on r through w is of the same sign as w′(e). Implicitly
differentiating (D.4) with respect to e, we may obtain
w′(e) =
w2
F ′(`?)V
′′ (w`? (1− µ))
V ′ (w`? (1− µ)) + w`? (1− µ)V ′′ (w`? (1− µ)) .
Since w`? (1− µ) > 0, w′(e) will be negative if condition (1) from the Proposition holds, in which
case the effect of e on r through w will be negative.
Next, we may obtain the direct effect of e as
re =
ν ′(`?) (1− µ)w
[F ′ (`?)]2 [V ′ (w`? (1− µ))]2
{
V ′ (−w`?µ)V ′′ (w`? (1− µ))− V ′ (w`? (1− µ))V ′′ (−w`?µ)}
Thus, re is negative only if the term in braces is negative. This in turn is the case if
∂ [V ′′(a)/V ′(a)]
∂a
< 0,
which is true when V ′′′ ·V ′− (V ′′)2 < 0. This holds when condition (2) from the Proposition holds,
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition D.3
The arguments establishing that de/dX ≤ 0 (with strict equality as long as N > 0) are nearly
identical to in the Walrasian bargaining case, and are therefore omitted. Thus, there exist X? and
X?? such that forX < X? the equilibrium satisfiesN ≥ L (labor market is tight), forX ∈ (X?, X??)
the equilibrium satisfies 0 < N < L (labor market is slack), and for X ≥ X?? we have N = 0.
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Lemma D.3. Suppose X ∈ (X?, X??), so that the labor market is slack but there is strictly positive
employment, i.e., 0 < N < L. Then dc/dX < 0 and there is deficient demand.
Proof. As before, let θ ≡ N/L be labor-market tightness and µ (θ) ≡ min{θ, 1} be the resulting
employment rate, and note that since N < L we have µ (θ) = θ. Conditional on e, we may obtain
from equation (D.11) that
` = ` (e) ≡ Ω−1
(
Φ
1− s − τe
)
,
where
Ω (`) ≡ F (`)− ν (`)F
′ (`)
ν ′ (`)
.
It may be easily verified that Ω′ (`) > 0, so that Ω−1 is well-defined.
Letting W ≡ w` be the total wage bill, given e we may obtain
p = p (e) ≡ ν
′ (` (e))
F ′ (` (e))
,
θ = θ (e) ≡ e
F (` (e))− Φ ,
W =W (e) ≡ ν (`) + p sΦ
1− s − τpe.
Equilibrium is then a solution to
U ′ (X + e) = Q (e) ≡ p (e) [1 + τ − τθ (e)] ,
for e (provided this solution satisfies θ (e) ≤ 1). As usual, we will have dc/dX < 0 if and only if
Q′ (e) < 0.65 Since `′(e) < 0, it is easily verified that p′(e) < 0 and θ′(e) > 0, so that Q′ (e) < 0
necessarily holds.
Next, welfare conditional on e is given by
U (X, e) = U (X + e) + p (e)
[
sΦ
1− sθ (e)− (1 + τ) e
]
.
Taking the derivative with respect to e and evaluating at the equilibrium, we may obtain
U2 (X, e) = Q (e) + p′ (e)
[
sΦ
1− sθ − (1 + τ) e
]
+ p (e)
[
sΦ
1− sθ
′ (e)− (1 + τ)
]
.
It may be verified that
`′ (e) = − τp`
ν (`) Epl (`) ,
θ′ (e) =
p
W
[
1 + τθ
Eνl (`)
Epl (`)
]
,
p′ (e) = − τp
2
ν (`)
,
65 Note that this necessarily follows only under the maintained assumption that τ is sufficiently small such
that a unique equilibrium exists.
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where Epl (`) ≡ ν
′′(`)`
ν′(`) − F
′′(`)`
F ′(`) > 0 and Eνl (`) = ν
′(`)`
ν(`) > 0. Using these relationships, plus the fact
that θ = pe/W, yields (after some algebra)
U2 (X, e) = τ
2p2e
ν (`)
(1− θ) + sΦ
1− s
p2
W
[
1 + τθ
Eνl (`)
Epl (`)
]
> 0,
so that there is deficient demand.
Lemma D.4. Suppose X < X?, so that the labor market is tight, i.e., N > L. Then dc/dX > 0
and there is not deficient demand.
Proof. Using the notation defined in the proof of Lemma D.3, we may obtain
` = ` (e) ≡ Ω¯−1 ([1 + τ (1− s)] e) ,
p (e) ≡ ν
′ (` (e))
F ′ (` (e))
,
θ = θ (e) ≡ F (` (e))− e
Φ
,
W =W (e) ≡ p (e) e,
where
Ω¯ (`) ≡ sF (`) + (1− s) ν (`)F
′ (`)
ν ′ (`)
,
and, by assumption, Ω¯′ (`) > 0 (see footnote 56) so that Ω¯−1 is well-defined. Equilibrium is then
given by a solution to
U ′ (X + e) = p (e) ,
for e (provided this solution satisfies θ(e) > 1). We will clearly have dc/dX > 0 if and only if
p′ (e) > 0. Since Ω¯′ (`) > 0, it is easily verified that p′(e) > 0, so that indeed dc/dX > 0.
Next, equilibrium welfare conditional on e is given by
U (X, e) = U (X + e)− ν (` (e)) .
Taking derivatives with respect to e and evaluating at the equilibrium, we may obtain
U2 (X, e) = −
(1− s) p
[
τ +
Epl(`)
Eνl(`)
]
1− (1− s) Epl(`)Eνl(`)
.
It may be verified that the assumption Ω¯′ (`) > 0 implies that the denominator of this expression
is strictly positive, and thus U2 (X, e) < 0 so that there is not deficient demand.
Proof of Proposition D.4
The proofs of Lemmas D.3 and D.4 establish that when X ∈ (X?, X??) we have dp/de < 0 and
d`/de < 0, while when X < X? we have dp/de > 0 and d`/de > 0. Proposition D.4 then follows
immediately.
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Proof of Proposition D.5
The arguments establishing that de/dX ≤ 0 (with strict equality as long as N > 0) are nearly
identical to in the Walrasian bargaining case, and are therefore omitted. Thus, there exist X? and
X?? such that forX < X? the equilibrium satisfiesN ≥ L (labor market is tight), forX ∈ (X?, X??)
the equilibrium satisfies 0 < N < L (labor market is slack), and for X ≥ X?? we have N = 0.
It is easily verified that, when X > X?, ξ = 0 and thus the system is identical to the Nash
bargaining case with s = 0, and thus the desired properties in this case follow directly from
Proposition D.4. We thus focus only on the case where X < X?.
Lemma D.5. There does not exist an equilibrium with N > L.
Proof. When N > L, we have ξ = 1. Since Φ > 0, from the zero-profit condition (D.13) we see
that this value of ξ cannot be consistent with an equilibrium.
Thus, for X < X? we must have N = L. This implies
` = ` (e) ≡ F−1 (e+ Φ) , (D.18)
p (e) =
ν ′ (` (e))
F ′ (` (e))
. (D.19)
Since the matching function is not differentiable at the point N = L, any value ξ < 1 of the worker’s
share of the match surplus can be consistent with zero firm profits as long as e is appropriately
chosen. Equivalently, given e, we may obtain a worker’s share consistent with zero profit via
ξ = ξ (e) ≡
(1 + τ) e− ν(`(e))p(e)
(1 + τ) e− ν(`(e))p(e) + Φ
∈ [0, 1). (D.20)
Thus, an equilibrium is a solution to
U ′ (X + e) = p (e) ,
for e (provided this solution satisfies e ≥ e?, where e? is the maximum value of e below which the
equilibrium features N < L66), in which case w is given by (D.12) with ξ = ξ (e), i.e., w = pe/`.
Since `′ (e) > 0, we have p′ (e) > 0, and thus dc/dX > 0.
Next, equilibrium welfare conditional on e is given by
U (X, e) = U (X + e)− ν (` (e)) .
Taking derivatives with respect to e and evaluating at the equilibrium, it is straightforward to show
that U2 (X, e) = 0, so that there is not deficient demand, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition D.6
We suppose there is a competitive insurance industry offering a menu of unemployment insurance
contracts. A typical contract is denoted (h, q), where h is the premium, paid in all states, and
q is the coverage, which the purchaser of the contract receives if and only if he is unemployed.
Both h and q are expressed in units of good 1. Since insurance is only potentially useful when
66 This value is given implicitly by Ω
(
F−1 (e? + Φ)
)
+ τe? = Φ, where Ω (`) ≡ F (`)− ν(`)F ′(`)ν′(`) .
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0 < µ < 1, we henceforth assume that this is true. Note also that zero profit of insurers requires
that h = (1 − µρ̂)q, where ρ̂ is the fraction of purchasers of the contract that are participant
households. This implies that non-participant households will not purchase any such zero-profit
contract featuring q < 0.
Lemma D.6. In any separating equilibrium, no contracts are purchased by participant house-
holds.67
Proof. Suppose there is a separating equilibrium, and let (hp, qp) denote the contract purchased
by participant households, and (hn, qn) that purchased by non-participant households. From the
insurer’s zero-profit condition, we must have hp = (1 − µ)qp and hn = qn. Since non-participant
households will always deviate to any contract with hp < qp, this implies that we must have qp < 0
in such an equilibrium.
Next, for any zero-profit separating contract, the assets of employed participant households are
given by Ae = w`− p[(1−µ)qp + e] and of unemployed participant households by Au = p(µqp− e).
Note that, since qp < 0 and from the resource constraint wl > pc, we must have Au < 0 < Ae. Also,
the derivative of the household’s objective function with respect to qp along the locus of zero-profit
contracts is given by
∂U
∂qp
= pµ(1− µ) [V ′(Au)− V ′(Ae)] > 0,
wherever such a derivative exists. Since Au < 0 < Ae, this derivative must exist at the candidate
equilibrium, and therefore in a neighborhood of that equilibrium the objective function is strictly
increasing on qp < 0. Thus, given any candidate zero-profit equilibrium contract with qp < 0,
there exists an alternative contract (h′p, q′p) with q′p > qp which satisfies that h′p − (1 − µ)q′p is
strictly greater than but sufficiently close to zero so that participant households would choose it
over (hp, qp), while non-participant households would not choose it, and therefore insurers could
make a positive profit selling it. Thus, (hp, qp) cannot be an equilibrium contract. Since this holds
for all qp < 0, it follows that no separating equilibrium exists in which contracts are purchased by
participant households.
Next, consider a pooling equilibrium, so that ρ̂ = ρ. As argued above, we must have q ≥ 0 in
any such equilibrium. Assets of an employed worker when choosing a zero-profit pooling contract
(h, q) = ((1 − µρ)q, q) are given by Ae = w` − p[(1 − µρ)q + e], while Au = p(µρq − e) are those
of an unemployed worker. Let U(q) denote the value of the household’s objective function when
choosing such a zero-profit pooling contract.
Lemma D.7. If U(q) is strictly decreasing in q whenever Ae > Au, then a pooling equilibrium does
not exist.
Proof. Note first that if Ae ≤ Au, then being unemployed is always strictly preferred to being
employed by participant households, so that this cannot represent an equilibrium. Furthermore, as
argued above, we must have q ≥ 0 in any pooling equilibrium. Thus, suppose Ae > Au and q > 0.
We show that such a q cannot represent an equilibrium. To see this, let (h′, q′) denote an alternative
contract with 0 < q′ < q and h′ = (1 − µρ)q′. Since U is strictly decreasing in q, this contract is
strictly preferred by participant households. Furthermore, since non-participant households would
get net payment µρ(q′ − q) < 0 from deviating to this new contract, only participant households
would deviate to it, and therefore the expected profit to an insurer offering it would be (1−ρ)µq′ > 0.
67 Technically, agents are always indifferent between not purchasing a contract and purchasing the trivial
contract (0, 0). For ease of terminology, we will assume that this trivial contract does not exist.
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Thus, this deviation is mutually beneficial for participants and insurers, and so q cannot be an
equilibrium.
Lemma D.8. If ρ < 1/(1 + τ), then there is no equilibrium in which an insurance contract is
purchased by participant households.
Proof. Note that U(q) is continuous, with
U ′(q) = pµ [(1− µ)ρV ′ (Au)− (1− µρ)V ′ (Ae)] ,
wherever this derivative exists (i.e., whenever AeAu 6= 0). If AeAu > 0, then V ′(Ae) = V ′(Au),
and therefore U ′(q) = −pµ(1 − ρ)V ′(Ae) < 0. Suppose on the other hand that AeAu < 0. If in
addition Ae > Au, we must have Au < 0 < Ae, and therefore U ′(q) = −pvµ{1 − ρ[1 + τ(1 − µ)]}.
Since ρ < 1/(1 + τ), it follows that U ′(q) < 0. Thus, U(q) is strictly decreasing whenever Ae > Au,
and therefore by Lemma D.7, no pooling equilibrium exists. Since, by Lemma D.6, there does not
exist a separating equilibrium either, no equilibrium exists.
E A Version with Productive Capital
E.1 Setup and Main Results
We have shown how a rise in the supply of the capital goodX, by decreasing demand for employment
and causing households to increase precautionary savings, can perversely lead to a decrease in
consumption. While thus far we have considered the case where X enters directly into the utility
function, in this section we show that Proposition 4 can be extended to the case where X is
introduced as a productive capital good. To explore this in the simplest possible setting, suppose
there are now two types of firms and that the capital stock X no longer enters directly into the
agents’ utility function. The first type of firm remains identical to those in the first version of the
model, except that instead of producing a consumption good they produce an intermediate good,
the amount of which is given by M. There is also now a continuum of competitive firms who rent
the productive capital good X from the households and combine it with goods purchased from the
intermediate goods firms in order to produce the consumption good according to the production
function g(X,M). We assume that g is strictly increasing in both arguments and concave, and
exhibits constant returns to scale. Given X, it can be verified that the equilibrium determination
of M will then be given as the solution to
gM(X,M)U ′(g(X,M)) = Q(M), (E.1)
where Q(·) is defined in equation (16).
Note the similarity between condition (E.1) and the corresponding equilibrium condition for
the durable-goods version of the model, which can be written U ′(X + e) = Q(e). In fact, if
g(X,M) = X +M, so that the elasticity of substitution between capital and the intermediate
good M is infinite, then the two conditions become identical, and therefore X affects economic
activity in the productive-capital version of the model in exactly the same way as it does in the
durable-goods model. Thus, a rise in X leads to a fall in consumption when the economy is in the
unemployment regime. In fact, as stated in Proposition E.1, this latter result will hold for a more
general g as long as g does not feature too little substitutability between X and M.68
68 We assume throughout this section that an equilibrium exists and is unique. Conditions under which this
is true are similar to the ones obtained for the durable-goods model, though the presence of non-linearities
in g makes explicitly characterizing them less straightforward in this case.
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Proposition E.1. If the equilibrium is in the full-employment regime, then an increase in produc-
tive capital leads to an increase in consumption. If the equilibrium is in the unemployment regime,
then an increase in productive capital leads to a decrease in consumption if and only if the elasticity
of substitution between X and M is not too small.
The reason for the requirement in Proposition E.1 that the elasticity of substitution be suffi-
ciently large relates to the degree to which an increase in X causes an initial impetus that favors less
employment. If the substitutability between X and M is small, so that complementarity is large,
then even though the same level of consumption could be achieved at a lower level of employment,
a social planner would nonetheless want to increase employment. Since the multiplier process in
our model simply amplifies – and can never reverse – this initial impetus, strong complementarity
would lead to a rise in employment and therefore a rise in consumption, rather than a fall. In con-
trast, if this complementarity is not too large, then an increase in X generates an initial impetus
that favors less employment, which is in turn amplified by the multiplier process, so that a decrease
in consumption becomes more likely.69
Let us emphasize that the manner in which we have just introduced productive capital into our
setup is incomplete – and possibly unsatisfying – since we are maintaining a static environment
with no investment decision. In particular, it is reasonable to think that the more interesting aspect
of introducing productive capital into our setup would be its effect on investment demand. To this
end, we now consider extending the model to a simple two-period version that features investment.
The main result from this endeavor is to emphasize that the conditions under which a rise in X
leads to a fall in consumption are weaker than those required for the same result in the absence of
investment. In other words, our results from the previous section extend more easily to a situation
where X is interpreted as physical capital if we simultaneously introduce an investment decision.
The reason for this is that, in the presence of an investment decision, a rise in X is more likely to
cause an initial impetus in favor of less activity.
To keep this extension as simple as possible, let us consider a two-period version of our model
with productive capital (where there remains a morning and an afternoon in each period). In this
case, it can be verified that the continuation value for household j for the second period is of the
form R(X2) · X2,j , where X2,j is capital brought by household j into the second period and X2
is capital brought into that period by all other households. In order to rule out the possibility of
multiple equilibria that could arise in the presence of strategic complementarity in investment, we
assume we are in the case where R′(X2) < 0. The description of the model is then completed by
specifying the capital accumulation equation,
X2 = (1− δ)X1 + i, (E.2)
where i denotes investment in the first period and X1 is the initial capital stock, as well as the new
first-period resource constraint,
c+ i = g(X1,M). (E.3)
Given this setup, we need to replace the equilibrium condition from the static model (equa-
tion (E.1)) with the constraints (E.2) and (E.3) plus the following two first-order conditions,
gM(X1,M)U ′(c) = Q(M), (E.4)
U ′(c) = R(X2). (E.5)
69 Note that a rise in X also increases output for any given level of employment. To ensure that consump-
tion falls in equilibrium, we require that the substitutability between X andM be large enough so that the
drop in employment more than offsets this effect.
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Equation (E.4) is the household’s optimality condition for its choice of consumption, and is similar to
its static counterpart (E.1), while equation (E.5) is the intertemporal optimality condition equating
the marginal value of consumption with the marginal value of investment.
Of immediate interest is whether, in an unemployment-regime equilibrium, a rise in X1 will
produce an equilibrium fall in consumption and/or employment in the first period. As Proposi-
tion E.2 indicates, the conditions under which our previous results extend are weaker than those
required in Proposition E.1 for the static case, in the sense that lower substitution between X and
M is possible.
Proposition E.2. In the two-period model with productive capital,70 an increase in capital leads to
a decrease in both consumption and investment if and only if the elasticity of substitution between X
and M is not too small. Furthermore, for a given level of equilibrium employment, this minimum
elasticity of substitution is lower than that required in Proposition E.1 in the absence of investment
decisions.
The intuition for why consumption and investment fall when the elasticity of substitution is
high is similar to in the static case. The addition of the investment decision has the effect of
making it more likely that an increase in X leads to a fall in consumption because the increase in
X decreases investment demand, which in turn increases unemployment and precautionary savings.
E.2 Proofs of Appendix E Propositions
Proof of Proposition E.1
The following result will be useful.
Lemma E.1. Let EgXM denote the elasticity of substitution between X andM embodied in g. Then
EgXM =
gX(X,M)gM(X,M)
gXM(X,M)g(X,M) . (E.6)
Proof. Letting Hk denote homogeneity of degree k, note first that, since g is H1, for a, b ∈ {X,M},
ga is H
0 and gab is H
−1.
Next, by definition, we have
EgXM ≡
[
d log (gX(X,M)/gM(X,M))
d log (M/X)
]−1
.
Letting M˜ ≡M/X and using H0 of gX and gM, we may obtain
EgXM =
gX(1,M˜)
gI(1,M˜)M˜
[
d
dM˜
(
gX(1,M˜)
gM(1,M˜)
)]−1
=
gX(1,M˜)gM(1,M˜)
M˜
[
gXM(1,M˜)gI(1,M˜)− gX(1,M˜)gMM(1,M˜)
]
=
gX(X,M)gM(X,M)
M [gXM(X,M)gM(X,M)− gX(X,M)gMM(X,M)] ,
70 We are again assuming that the equilibrium exists, is unique, and is in the unemployment regime.
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where the last line follows fromH0 of ga andH
−1 of gab. Adding and subtracting gXM(X,M)gX(X,M)X
in the denominator and grouping terms yields
EgXM =
gX(X,M)gM(X,M)
gXM(X,M) [gX(X,M)X + gM(X,M)M]− gX(X,M) [gXM(X,M)X + gMM(X,M)M] .
The first bracketed term in the denominator equals g(X,M) by H1 of g, while the second bracketed
term equals 0 by H0 of gM, and thus equation (E.6) follows.
Next, let W (X,M) ≡ U(g(X,M)). Then the equilibrium condition (E.1) can be written
WM(X,M) = Q(M). (E.7)
Note that
WMM(X,M) = [gM(X,M)]2 U ′′(g(X,M)) + gMMU ′(g(X,M)) < 0,
so that the left-hand side of equation (E.7) is strictly decreasing in M. To ensure the existence
of an equilibrium with M > 0, we assume that WM(X, 0) > Q(0). We further assume that
gMMM(X,M) ≥ 0, which ensures that QMMM > 0, and therefore, similar to in the durable-
goods model, there are at most three equilibria: at most two in the unemployment regime, and at
most one in the full-employment regime. Additional conditions under which we can ensure that
there exists a unique equilibrium are similar in flavor to in the durable-goods case, though less easily
characterized explicitly. We henceforth simply assume conditions are such that the equilibrium is
unique, and note that this implies that
WMM(X,M) < Q′(M) (E.8)
at the equilibrium value of M. Define also
EQM ≡
Q′(M)M
Q(M)
as the elasticity of Q with respect to M.
Lemma E.2. dc/dX < 0 if and only if
− EQMEgXM > 1. (E.9)
Proof. Differentiating the equilibrium condition (E.7) with respect to X yields that
dM
dX
=
WXM(X,M)
Q′(M)−WMM(X,M) . (E.10)
Doing the same with the equilibrium condition c = g(X,M) yields
dc
dX
= gX(X,M) + gM(X,M)dM
dX
=
gX(X,M) [Q′(M)−WMM(X,M)] + gM(X,M)WXM(X,M)
Q′(M)−WMM(X,M) ,
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where the second line has used (E.10). By (E.8), the denominator is positive, so that this expression
is of the same sign as the numerator. Substituting in for WMM and WXM and using the equilibrium
condition (E.7), we may obtain that dc/dX < 0 if and only if[
gXM(X,M)
gX(X,M) −
gMM(X,M)
gM(X,M)
]
M < −EQM. (E.11)
The term in square brackets, meanwhile, can be written as
gXM(X,M) [gX(X,M)X + gM(X,M)M]− gX(X,M) [gXM(X,M)X + gMM(X,M)M]
gX(X,M)gM(X,M)M .
By H0 of gM, the second term in the numerator equals zero, and thus by H1 of g, we have that
gXM(X,M)
gX(X,M) −
gMM(X,M)
gM(X,M) =
gXM(X,M)g(X,M)
gX(X,M)gM(X,M)M .
Substituting this into (E.11) and using (E.6) yields (E.9).
If the economy is in the full-employment regime, EQM > 0 and therefore, since EgXM > 0,
condition (E.9) cannot hold. Thus, from Lemma E.2, if the economy is in the full-employment
regime, dc/dX > 0. If instead the economy is in the unemployment regime, then EQM < 0, and
therefore condition (E.9) can hold as long as EgXM is sufficiently large, which completes the proof
of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition E.2
Let y = g(X1,M) denote output of the final good in the first period. Furthermore, let B(X2) ≡
U ′−1(R(X2)) +X2 denote the total resources (output plus undepreciated first-period capital) that
would be required for the choice X2 to satisfy the constraints (E.2) and (E.3) as well as the
intertemporal optimality condition (E.5), and note that
B′(X2) =
R′(X2)
U ′′(c)
+ 1 > 1, (E.12)
where the inequality follows from the assumption made that R′(X2) < 0. Since total resources
actually available are (1 − δ)X1 + g(X1,M), we have X2 = B−1((1 − δ)X1 + g(X1,M)), and
therefore from condition (E.4) equilibrium can be characterized by a solution to
G(X1,M) = Q(M), (E.13)
for M, where G(X,M) ≡ gM(X,M)R(B−1((1− δ)X + g(X,M))). Note that
GM(X1,M) = gMM(X1,M)R(X2) + R
′(X2) [gM(X1,M)]2
B′(X2)
< 0.
Similar to in the static case, we assume that G(X, 0) > Q(0) so that there is an equilibrium with
M > 0, and further, conditions are such that this equilibrium is unique, which implies that
GM(X1,M) < Q′(M) (E.14)
at the equilibrium value of M.
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Lemma E.3. If dX2/dX1 < 0 then dc/dX1 < 0 and di/dX1 < 0.
Proof. Since in equilibrium c+X2 = B(X2), we have that
dc
dX1
=
[
B′(X2)− 1
] dX2
dX1
.
Since B′(X2) > 1, if dX2/dX1 < 0 then dc/dX1 < 0. Further, if X2 falls when X1 rises, from the
capital accumulation equation (E.2) we see that i must also fall.
Lemma E.4. dX2/dX1 < 0 if and only if{
−EQM +
(1− δ)gXM(X,M)
gX(X,M) [gX(X,M) + 1− δ]
}
EgXM > 1. (E.15)
Proof. Differentiating the equilibrium condition (E.13) with respect to X1 yields that
dM
dX1
=
GX(X1,M)
Q′(M)−GM(X1,M) . (E.16)
Doing the same with y = g(X,M) yields
dy
dX1
= gX(X1,M) + gM(X1,M)dM
dX1
, (E.17)
while differentiating X2 = B
−1((1− δ)X1 + g(X1,M)) yields
dX2
dX1
=
1
B′(X2)
(
1− δ + dy
dX1
)
=
[1− δ + gX(X1,M)] [Q′(M)−GM(X1,M)] + gM(X1,M)GX(X1,M)
B′(X2) [Q′(M)−GM(X1,M)] ,
where the second line has used equations (E.16) and (E.17). Since the denominator of this expression
is positive by (E.12) and (E.14), the sign of dX2/dX1 is given by the sign of the numerator.
Substituting in for GM and GX and using (E.13), some algebra yields that this expression is
negative if and only if condition (E.15) holds.
Lemmas E.3 and E.4 together indicate that dc/dX1 < 0 and di/dX1 < 0 both hold if and only
if condition (E.15) holds. Further, for a given equilibrium level ofM, it is clear that the minimum
level of EgXM needed to satisfy (E.15) is (weakly) greater than that needed to satisfy (E.9) in the
static case.
F TFP Growth During Recessions
Figure F.1 plots for US postwar period the depth of recessions and length of Recoveries against
TFP growth during the Recession. We find no significant relationship. Furthermore, TFP growth
is indeed positive in 7 out of the 9 recessions we have observed since 1958.
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Figure F.1: Depth of Recession and Length of Recovery vs. TFP Growth During the
Recession
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Note: Horizontal axis is TFP growth from peak to trough. Vertical axis is either depth of recession, measured
as percentage difference in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, or length of recovery, measured
as the number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach again the peak level.
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G A simple RBC Model with Irrational Exuberance
or TFP shocks
Here we contrast our mechanism with the one of a simple RBC model.
G.1 Model
Preferences are given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
log ct + ν
`1+ωt
1 + ω
)
.
Technology is given by
Yt = AK
α
t−1 (θt`t)
1−α ,
and the law of motion of capital is
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It,
with the resource constraint
It = Yt − Ct.
We assume that θ is a stochastic technological drift that follows the process
θt = γ
t
θθ̂t.
When we simulate the model with irrational exuberance, θ̂t is a constant. In the case of TFP
shocks, θ̂ is a random walk:
θ̂t = θ̂t−1eεt ,
where ε is normally i.i.d. with mean zero and variant σ2.
The model calibration follows the same logic than in the main text, but K stands here for total
capital. We set γθ = 1.0048 to match average per capita GDP growth. We set discount factor and
depreciation rate to the commonly chosen levels β = .99 and δ = .025. We set α = 2/3 to obtain a
labor income share of 2/3. The Frish elasticity of labor supply in the intensive margin ω is set to
.5 following Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber [2011]. A is normalized to 1 and ν is set to reach
the normalized level of hours per capita ` = 1.
G.2 Irrational Exuberance
Episodes of irrational exuberance are modeled as in the main text. The economy can be either in
normal times or in an episode of exuberance, but actual TFP always grows at factor γθ. In normal
times, actual growth is anticipated by economic agents when making spending decisions. With
probability 1 − p1, the economy stays in the normal time regime the next period, whereas with
probability p1 it enters in an episode of irrational exuberance. When the economy is exuberant,
agents optimistically believe that TFP is for this period growing at a higher factor κγθ, where
κ > 1 measure the degree of optimism. In contrast with our model, there is here a representative
household, but we assume as in our model that it splits between a shopper and a worker that do not
communicate, so that consumptions decisions are taken according to expected TFP, whereas labor
supply decision is taken according to observed TFP. Investment is then residually pinned down by
the household budget constraint.
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We then need to set the level of optimism in irrational exuberance κ and the transition prob-
abilities p1 and p2. We calibrate these parameters to minimize the distance between model and
data for three of the four moments of the U.S. business cycle that we have used for our model: the
standard deviation of output growth (0.96%), the average length of a recovery (6 quarters) and
the number of recessions episodes over an history of 270 quarters (9 episodes). 71 The resulting
parameters are presented in Table G.1. The parameters values we obtain are much less appealing
than in our model, as it takes a lot of irrational exuberance to match the data. The degree of
optimism takes the value κ = 3.78, meaning that in an optimistic quarter, agents believe that the
growth rate of TFP is 1.33% instead of the average rate of .48%. The probability of entering in
an optimistic episode is p1 = .89, and the probability of staying one more period is a exuberant
episode is p2 = .89. With this calibration, an exuberant episode last for an average of ten quarters.
As shown in Table G.1, the correlation of cumulated investment and depth of recessions or length
Table G.1: Targeted and Non Targeted Moments, RBC Model with Exuberance Shocks
Moment Data Model
Targeted Moments
s.d of output growth .96% .94%
Average length of a recovery 6 7.6
Number of recession episodes 3.3 3.2
Non Targeted Moments
Average depth of a recession -2.9% -3.8%
cor(ci,length) .77 -.88
cor(ci,depth) .85 -.91
Note: “Data” refers to postwar US data, and “Model” to 10,000 simulations of 270 quarters of the simple
RBC model with irrational exuberance. ci stands for capital accumulation, measured as cumulated per capita
investment over past 10 years and detrended using a cubic trend. “Depth” represents the depth of recession,
measured as percentage difference in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, and “length” is
the length of recovery, measured as the number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach again
the peak level. The number of recession episodes is per 100 quarters. In the model simulations, peaks and
troughs are detected using Harding and Pagan’s [2002] version of Bry and Boschan’s [1971] algorithm.
of recoveries is close to -1, as oppose to close to 1 in the data. This is illustrated on Figure G.1,
that shows the scatter plot of depth and length against cumulated investment for one simulation
of the RBC model.
Finally, G.2 displays the path of an economy that is on a balanced growth path until period 4,
and that enters in period 5 into a 8-quarters episode of exuberance. In contrast with our model,
output jumps back on the balanced growth path (and not below) at the end of the boom episode,
and capital is below trend during the boom.
G.3 TFP Shocks
Finally, we consider the simple RBC model with TFP shocks only. The variance of shocks innovation
is calibrated to match the standard deviation of output growth, which is obtained for σ = .774%.
71As we have only three parameters, we do not target the average depth of a recession (-2.9%)
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Figure G.1: Depth of Recession and Length of Recovery vs. Cumulated Total Investment
in One Simulation of a simple RBC Model with Irrational Exuberance
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Note: Horizontal axis is capital accumulation, measured as cumulated per capita investment over past 10
years and detrended using a cubic trend. Vertical axis is either depth of recession, measured as percentage
difference in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, or length of recovery, measured as the
number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach again the peak level.
The other moments, which are not calibrated, are displayed in Table G.2. The correlation of
cumulated investment and depth of recessions or length of recoveries is small and positive, but
never significant. This is illustrated for one simulation in Figure G.3.
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Figure G.2: An Episode of Irrational Exuberance in a Simple RBC Model
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Note: Note: The dashed line represents the path of the variable along the balanced growth path. The plain
line is associated with 8-quarters episode of irrational exuberance that starts in period 5. During this episode,
agents believe that TFP growth rate is 1.33% per quarter instead of .48%. e represents total expenditures on
goods and X̂t is the stock of durables. See the text for functional forms and parameters calibration.
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Table G.2: Targeted and Non Targeted Moments, RBC Model with TFP Shocks
Moment Data Model
Targeted Moments
s.d of output growth .96% .96%
Non Targeted Moments
Average length of a recovery 6 9.3
Number of recession episodes 3.3 2.5
Average depth of a recession -2.9% -5.1%
cor(ci,length) .77 .3
cor(ci,depth) .85 .24
Note: “Data” refers to postwar US data, and “Model” to 10,000 simulations of 270 quarters of the plain RBC
model with TFP shocks. ci stands for capital accumulation, measured as cumulated per capita investment
over past 10 years and detrended using a cubic trend. “Depth” represents the depth of recession, measured
as percentage difference in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, and “length” is the length
of recovery, measured as the number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach again the peak
level. The number of recession episodes is per 100 quarters. In the model simulations, peaks and troughs are
detected using Harding and Pagan’s [2002] version of Bry and Boschan’s [1971] algorithm.
Figure G.3: Depth of Recession and Length of Recovery vs. Cumulated Total Investment
in One Simulation of a simple RBC Model with TFP Shocks
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
K at peak (% deviation from trend)
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
D
ep
th
of
th
e
re
ce
ss
io
n
(%
)
Corr: 0.28, P-value: 0.65
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20
K at peak (% deviation from trend)
6
8
10
12
14
16
L
en
gt
h
of
re
co
ve
ry
(q
u
ar
te
rs
)
Corr: -0.06, P-value: 0.92
Note: Horizontal axis is capital accumulation, measured as cumulated per capita investment over past 10
years and detrended using a cubic trend. Vertical axis is either depth of recession, measured as percentage
difference in real per capita GDP from peak to subsequent trough, or length of recovery, measured as the
number of quarters it takes for real per capita GDP to reach again the peak level.
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